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Revocable Gifts of Legal Interests
in Land
By Jom L. GAnvEy
Chapter I: Introduction
Centuries ago Sir Francis Bacon observed and commented
upon the "excess of evils in men's minds, affecting to have the
assurance of their estate, and possession to be revocable in their
own times, and irrevocable after their own times."' Though
Bacon might have lamented this proclivity of mankind to "eat
his cake, yet have it too," he recognized its influence on the
development of the law and thus approved the foundation of our
modem law of revocable trusts.
The current popularity of the revocable trust in the United
States indicates that human nature has not changed through the
centuries. Undoubtedly much impetus was given to the growth
of the revocable trust in this country by the lenient manner in
which it was treated by the tax laws; but statutory modifications
have curtailed most of these advantages,' and the revocable trust
continues to enjoy favor as a means of disposing of property,
particularly as a means of gratuitously dividing it among family
and friends.
There are many reasons for the continued popularity of this
method of making gifts. One of the strongest deterrents to everyone's generous impulses is the fear that he might lose what he
has and then be embarrassed by the want of the property given
away. This deterrent is minimized when donors are permitted
to retain a right to recover the property at any time they need or
desire it. Undoubtedly another reason why many settlors retain
a power of revocation is a desire to influence or exert some control
over the subsequent conduct of the cestui. Thus the settlor can
0 This article is based on material submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the S.J.D. degree, University of Michigan.
1Bacon Law Tracts 316 (Readings on the Statute of Uses).
2 See Casner, Estate Planning 87 (2d ed. 1956).

KENTUCKY LAw JOuRNAL

[Vol. 54,

feel more or less secure in, at least, the ostensible affection and
loyalty of the cestui if he realizes that the property might be
taken away from him if and when he incurs the disfavor of his
donor.
That neither of these reasons for seeking an element of revocability in gifts is peculiar to English speaking peoples seems evidenced by the civil law of gifts. In the Code of Justinian 3 we find
authority for the revocation of gifts because of the ingratitude of
the donee "in order that no one may have permission to accept
the property of another, and then ridicule his liberality, subject
him to loss, and cause him to suffer the injuries above mentioned
from the ungrateful beneficiary of his bounty."4 Most civil law
systems have received this doctrine of ingratitude5 and permit
donors to revoke gifts on the basis of it.
But probably the principal reason for the popularity of the
revocable trust in the United States today lies in the fact that it
is a means of making a gift which is largely testamentary in
character but which is effective without passing through the
uncertainty, delay, and expense of probate. The testamentary
flavor of such gifts springs from the fact that the settlor is not
seriously impeded in enjoying the property as fully after the gift
as he did before the trust was established; he can enjoy the
current fruits of the property merely by reserving a life estate;
and should he ever desire or need the full beneficial interest, it
is quickly and easily recovered by exercising the power of
revocation. Yet the law considers these gifts inter vivos, and not
testamentary dispositions,' and thus yields to these donors many
advantages denied to testators.
By making the disposition while in good health, the donor
minimizes the possibility of its being upset on the basis of fraud,
undue influence, or want of legal capacity. By making the disposition before death, any doubt concerning its validity or construction can be litigated before it is too late for the settlor to
amend it. Moreover, though such gifts might at times be held to
be subject to the claims of a deceased donor's estate,7 yet the
3 Code of Justinian, Book VII, Tit. LVI.
4Translated in 14 Scott, The Civil Law 349 (1932).

5 See, e.g., French Civil Code (1803 art. 955. The provisions of the
Louisiana Civil Code (Revision of 1870) are similar, see art. 1560.
6 1 Scott, The Law of Trusts, sec. 57.1 (2d ed., 1956).
7 See 1 Scott, op. cit. supra note 6, at sec. 330.12.
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property is not tied up for the period of administration in the
usual case where the estate is clearly sufficient to satisfy all such
claims. And finally,s the financial savings resulting from avoiding
probate are often materialY
Thus it is seen that the revocable trust serves many useful
purposes in our society and will probably continue to enjoy favor
as a means of making gratuitous dispositions of wealth. The
trust, however, is a somewhat expensive and complex institution.
Its operation and use are beyond the knowledge of the average
layman. Moreover, it is not readily adaptable to all types of
property nor to the peculiar circumstances of all cases. The
question naturally presents itself: Does the law permit a man to
make similar gifts without using the instrumentality of the trust?
When making a direct gift to a donee, i.e., one not in trust, can a
donor retain an element of control which will enable him to
reclaim the property at some future time should he so desire?
It is the purpose of this study to explore this area of the law and
to determine to what extent such gifts of land' are valid.
8 Cesner suggests many other advantages derivable from a wise use of the
revocable trust. Casner, op. cit. supra note 2, at 87-106.
0 See King, Trusts as Substitutes for Wills, 73 Tr. & Es. 389 (1941), where
it is estimated that on the average it costs $7,400 in fees to transfer a $150,000
estate by will whereas the same disposition can be implemented by revocable
trust for only $1,400 in fees.
1o Though the term, gift, is ordinarily applied only to donations of personal
property, it is used herein to designate gratuitous transfers of land as well.
Though unusual, this is not an incorrect use of the term. See Black's Law
Dictionary (4th ed., 1951).

Chapter II: Validity of Clauses of Revocation

The thought of incorporating, in an otherwise absolute deed
of land, a clause providing for its revocation at the will of the
grantor is likely to be surprising to most American lawyers.
Though such provisions are common in trust instruments, they
are unusual in other conveyances and are likely to be viewed by
the uninitiated with feelings of doubt as an untested novelty.
Such misgivings are at least fifty per cent unfounded. For though
there might be some justification for considering provisos of
revocation in deeds of legal interests as untested, they are by no
means novel in Anglo-American law.
It has been said that the policy of the ancient common law
rendered any reservation or limitation in a feoffment repugnant
and void if it sought to permit the defeasance of the feoffee's
estate at the will of the feoffor. 1 The authors of these statements,
however, failed to cite any judicial authority to support them and
the members of the American Law Institute have expressly refused to take a position one way or the other on the common
law validity of conditions and limitations that involve no element
other than the exercise of the volition of the conveyor.2 Thus it
is conceivable that an ingenious feoffor might have accomplished
a revocable gift of land in this period by conveying a conditional
or determinable estate with the defeating or determining event
being an expression of his own will.3 It must be conceded, however, that if such an imaginative feoffor existed, his labors went
unnoticed; no case involving the validity of such a condition or
limitation has been found.
Though the possibility of accomplishing a revocable gift of a
legal interest in land is thus uncertain under the rules of the
ancient common law, it is clear that after the Statute of Uses such
gifts became frequent. Thus, Lord Coke spoke and approved of
...
clauses of provisoes, containing power of revocation, which
since Littleton wrote are crept into voluntarie conveyances,
1 1 Sugden, Powers 74 (3d A.ed., 1856). When speaking of these and other
reservations of a similar nature, Kent said that "all such refinements were
repugnant to the plain, direct mode of dealing, natural to simple manners and
unlettered ages." 4 Kent, Commentaries on American Law 0291.
2 See I Restatement, Property, Caveats to sees. 44h and 45g (1936).
3
This possibility is suggested in Simes and Smith, The Law of Future
Interests, sec. 285 (2d ed., 1955).
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which passe by raising of uses, being executed by the statute

of 27 H.8. and are become verie
frequent, and the inheritance
4
of many depend thereupon.
Unfortunately American lawyers tend to forget that the Statute
of Uses was an integral part of English conveyancing practice for
many centuries 5 and that the English family settlement before
1925 (whose powers of revocation have frequently been observed
by American courts) could be made to convey either legal or
equitable estates depending on whether the grant read "to X and
his heirs to the use of..." or "unto and to the use of X and his
heirs to the use of...."' Failure to perceive this fine distinction
in language has caused us to classify as revocable trusts, and
hence ignore, many English conveyances that actually were
revocable deeds of legal interests. Thus, from the language used
in Coke's Reports, it seems clear that such well known cases as
Albany's Case7 and Digges' Case" involved conveyances that
reserved the power to revoke legal, and not equitable, interests.
Indeed such conveyances became so common in England after
the Statute of Uses and their validity so well established 9 that it
is difficult to find a case in which this issue was actually litigated.

Before considering the American cases it should be noted that
there are several different ways that a prospective donor of land
might attempt to retain the power or ability of subsequently
revoking his gift. The most obvious and direct method that has
been used is the express reservation of a right or power of revocation in the deed itself. This study will be primarily concerned
with the effectiveness of such instruments to accomplish the
intentions of the parties.
Instead of reserving a power "to revoke" donors frequently
seek to accomplish the practical effects of revocability by reserving a power "to sell" or "to mortgage." If the donor is to have
the benefit of the proceeds of any such sale or mortgage,1 °
42 Co. Litt. *237a.

G
See Cheshire, The Modem Law of Real Property 94 (7th ed., 1954).
6
Radcliffe, Real Property Law 104-05 (2d ed., 1938). That the majority
of these settlements conveyed legal and not equitable interests, see Cheshire,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 70, 77.
7 1 Co. Rep. l10b, 76 Eng. Rep. 250 (1586).
8 1 Co. Rep. 173, 76 Eng. Rep. 873 (1585-1600).
9See Megarr,, The Law of Real Property 109 (2d ed., 1955).
10 Whether the grantor is to have the benefit of such proceeds is largely a
matter of construction. In the absence of language showing a contrary intent,
(Continued on next page)
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obviously the practical effects of such reservations are the same
as a reservation of the power of revocation; for the donor can
recover his economic loss and destroy the donee's economic gain
that resulted from the gift. Such reservations are merely powers
of revocation that must be exercised in a special manner and
have often been referred to as such." They give rise to the same
problems concerning the validity of the reservation to defeat the
donee's interest, its effect upon the rights of third persons, and
the testamentary and illusory flavor of the gift, as does the power
of revocation; therefore, cases involving such reservations will be
included throughout this discussion. When the donor is not to
have the benefit of the proceeds of the sale or mortgage, the
effect of the instrument remains that of an absolute gift; the
donor is able to change the identity of the property given, but
he cannot recover his economic loss nor destroy the donee's gain.
Though such instruments do not raise the same problems as
revocable deeds, they might be considered at least persuasive
authority on the validity and operation of these reservations in
divesting the donee's estate and vesting title to the property in
another; a few such cases will be mentioned subsequently in this
chapter where this problem is considered.
There are other means that a prospective donor of land might
adopt in seeking to make his gift revocable. Thus, he might
deliver an absolute deed to the donee but require him to execute
in return a separate instrument obliging him to reconvey the land
upon request. Unless the separate instrument is recorded with
the deed, it seems likely that the donor's interest in the land will
be cut off by a sale to a bona fide purchaser without notice;"
thus an attempt of this nature might be frustrated by the fraudu(Footnotes continued from preceding page)

it would seem that the presumption should always be that he is to enjoy such
proceeds. Harman v. Hurst, 160 Md. 96, 153 At. 24 (1931); but see W. Va.
Code (1961) see. 3536.
11 Smith v. Smith, 167 Ga. 368, 145 S.E. 661 (1928); Coins v. Melton, 343
Mo. 413, 121 S.W.2d 821 (1938); St. Louis County Nat. Bank v. Fielder, 364
Mo. 207, 260 S.W.2d 483 (1953); Goins v. Melton, 343 Mo. 413, 121 S.W.2d
821 (1938); Smith v. Smith, 167 Ga. 368, 145 S.E. 661 (1928); see also 3
Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, sec. 681 (3rd ed. 1939).
In Harman v. Hurst, 160 Md. 96, 153 AUt. 24 (1931), where the grantor had
reserved the right "to mortgage or sell," the court held that the power had been
validly exercised by a conveyance to a straw man. The court indicated that
under the equitable doctrine of reconversion such powers do not restrict the
grantor "to a transfer to another in exchange for money of that other."
12 This problem is discussed in Chapter IV.
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lent act of the donee. However, the effect of such a transaction
in a suit between the parties themselves is the same as it would
have been if the donor had incorporated the provision in the
deed itself. This conclusion was reached by the court in Strong's
Executors v. Brewer 3 where the court said:
There can be no doubt but that the deed of 1812, executed by
Johnson Strong to his son William, and the bond, executed

at the same time by William to his father, must be construed
together as parts of the same contract.... (I)t is now the settled rule, that several instruments in writing, executed at the
same time, betwveen the same parties, in reference to the same
subject matter, constitute but one agreement, and from all of
them the intention of the parties must be gathered, in giving
effect to the contract.
Since between the parties the practical effect of such transactions
is the same as a deed with an express provision authorizing its
revocation, cases involving these instruments will be considered
and discussed throughout this study.
Other prospective donors might seek to accomplish their
purpose by delivering a deed in absolute form to a third person
with instructions to give it to the donee at the donor's death if it
has not been recalled by the donor before then. Though such
gifts might have been valid at one time, the majority rule is
clearly to the contrary today. 14 In such cases the court views
such retention by the grantor of control over the deed as precluding an effective delivery of the instrument and thus concludes
that no interest passes to the donee thereby. Though such an
attempted gift seems inevitably doomed to failure, these cases
do raise the interesting question of the possibility of distinguishing between a condition on delivery and a condition on title.
This question and therefore some of these cases will be discussed
at length in the next chapter.
13 17 Ala. 706 (1850).
14.3 American Law of Property, see. 12.67 (1952); 4 Tiffany, The Law of
Real Property, sees. 1050, 1054 (2nd ed., 1939). See also Lambert v. Lambert,
77 R.I. 463, 77 A.2d .325 (1950); Rothney v. Rothney, 41 Cal. App. 2d 566, 107
P.2d 294 (1940); Wilson v. Wilson, 158 Ill.
567, 49 Am. St. Rep. 176 (1895).
But see In re Rynier's Estate, 847 Pa. 471, 32 A.2d 736 (1943); In re Hartmans
Estate, 320 Pa. 331, 182 Ad. 232 (1986).
Though the Iowa courts followed a contrary rule for many years, it has
recently been repudiated. Brandt v. Schucha, 250 Iowa 679, 96 N.W.2d 179
(1959).
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Courts often come to a similar result when the donor delivers
a deed to the donee but either incorporates a provision therein, or
extracts a promise from the grantee thereof, that the instrument
shall not be recorded until the grantor's death. In such cases the
grantor's purpose might be merely to reserve a life or some other
possessory estate in the property; or the grantor might be seeking
to make a revocable gift. If the former is his intention-if he
intends to lose all control over the deed but stipulates against
recording merely to reserve some estate in the land-the modem
rule is that the deed is a valid conveyance of a future interest
that cannot be defeated by any subsequent act of the grantor."
However, if the grantor stipulates against recording so that he
might exercise further control over the deed and "revest" title in
himself by cancelling or destroying it, these circumstances show
a lack of the necessary intent to constitute a valid delivery, and
the deed is generally held to be inoperative. 0 Of course the same
result is reached when the donor executes a deed in absolute form
but retains it among his papers and does nothing to indicate that
it is to have present legal effect. 7 Such an instrument clearly has
not been delivered, and the intended grantee receives no right to
the land unless the instrument can be probated as a valid will.'
And finally some donors have attempted to accomplish their
purposes by delivering an absolute deed to the donee and
extracting from him an oral promise that he will reconvey upon
request. In such cases there should be no argument about the
validity of the instrument to convey the title to the donee. Since
15 See Kiouda v. Pachousek, 414 IM. 75, 110 N.E.2d 258 (1953); Leach v.
Pratt, 30 Tenn. App. 380, 205 S.W.2d 970 (1947); Schornick v. Schornick, 25
Ariz. 563, 220 Pac. 397 (1923). Of course, the recording acts might cut off the
donee's interest in the property if the donor makes a subsequent conveyance to
one without notice.
16 Blachowske v. Blachowski, 135 N.J. Eq. 425, 39 A.2d 94 (1944); Klingler
v. Ottinger, 216 Ind. 9, 22 N.E. 805 (1939); Wilson v. Wilson, 158 IlM. 567
(1895); 3 American Law of Property, sec. 12.66 (1952); Ballantine, When Are
Deeds Testamentary, 18 Mich. L. Rev. 470 (1920).
If the stipulation against recording is not incorporated in the deed, some
courts might hold that the donee received an absolute title. This conclusion
results from the rule, of questionable validity, that every delivery into the hands
of the grantee is necessarily absolute. Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, see.
1049 '(3rd ed., 1939).
17 See Unsell v. Federal Land Bank of Houston, 138 S.W.2d 305 (Tem. Civ.
App., 1940).
18 1 Page, The Law of Wills, see. 5.14 (Bowe-Parker Rev. 1960). See also 1
Scott, The Law of Trusts, see. 56.7 (2d ed., 1956); Note, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 451
(1908).
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the grantor recognized the necessity of a reconveyance to revest
title in himself, it is clear that he intended the instrument to have
present effect, and thus, that there was a valid delivery. 19 The
difficulty with such a transfer, however, is that in the absence of
special circumstances that might take the promise out of the
Statute of Frauds, the donee is under only a moral obligation to
20
reconvey; there are no legal means of enforcing this obligation.
Though many gifts are undoubtedly made in this manner2 l to the
satisfaction of all parties concerned, they are beyond the scope
of this study.
The first American case found in which a donor of land
attempted to achieve the practical effect of a revocable gift is
Strong's Executors v. Brewer.2 2 In this case a father deeded realty
and personalty to his soon absolutely; at the same time the son
executed a penal bond to the father conditioned on the father's
enjoying the possession of the property for life and on his being
able to divide any or all of the property among his other children.
Several years later the father deeded to his daughter a slave
which had been included in the prior deed. Subsequently the
father became indebted to the son, and in satisfaction thereof
deeded all of his property including the slave to him. After the
death of the father the daughter sued the son in detinue for the
slave. The court held in favor of the daughter. Though the court
construed the deed and the bond as one instrument, it found no
repugnancy between the various provisions and held that effect
could be given to the intention of the parties. The court said:
Nor is there such repugnancy between the powers, reserved
to the father in the condition of the bond, and the deed,
executed by him to his son William, as will render the condition of the bond void.... If he [the father] failed to execute
that power, upon his death, the property would pass absolutely
19 In Huber v. Backus, 79 S.D. 342, 112 N.W.2d 238 (1961), where a man
had conveyed several tracts of land to his sister under her parol agreement to
reconvey upon request, the court said: "Under this arrangement his reserved
right . . . was to he effectuated by a conveyance from defendant which would
seem to confirm rather than den), the delivery of these deeds to her. If he had
intended that title was not to vest immediately in the defendant then there
would be no reason for their oral understanding."
20 1 Scott, The Law of Trusts, sec. 44 (2d ed., 1956).
2
1 Apparently such a gift was accomplished in Lindsay v. Christian, 222
Ark. 169, 257 S.W.2d 935 (1953).
2217 Ala. 706 (1850).
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and unconditionally to William Strong by the deed; but the
execution of the power, reserved to the father, would defeat
the title of William.
Thus the court seemed to recognize the validity of the first deed
to the son to pass the title of the property involved, but held that
the bond effectively reserved to the father the right and ability to
defeat that title. The fact that the case involved only the power
of the father to defeat the son's title in the personalty, it is submitted, does not detract from the weight of this case as a
precedent for revocable gifts of land; since the possibility of
dividing the ownership of personal property into successive
interests was not generally recognized until recently, the court's
reasoning is much more easily applied to realty than personalty.
The earliest American case found involving a deed of a legal
interest which contained a reservation of an express power of
revocation is Wall v. Wall.2 3 In this case an instrument conveying
realty and personalty provided: "The deed to take effect, as far
as regards the handing over of the property, at my death; and I
reserve to myself the right to revoke it at any time during my
life, by filing in the clerk's office a written revocation under my
hand and seal." After the death of the maker his executors had
the instrument admitted to probate as a will; the donees sought
to have the probate set aside. The court held the instrument
to be a deed and not a will and ruled in favor of the donees.
The court said:
Upon the whole, we consider that this deed conveyed the
present right to the property, to be enjoyed in possession at
the donor's death, and subject to his power to annul it in the
way limited in the deed.
Thus the court appears to recognize the validity of the reservation
and clearly holds that the instrument is effective to convey a title
to the donees.
It might be objected that neither of these cases is true
precedent sustaining the validity of revocable deeds to accomplish the desired result. The first case merely holds that after
executing such a deed, the maker can still convey a valid interest
in the property to another; such conclusion could be justified on
23 80 Miss. 91, 64 Am. Dec. 147 (1855).

1965]

]EvocABLE

GinTs OF LEGAL

INTEmEsTs

the ground that the instrument of gift was ineffective to convey
an interest to the intended donee. The second case, on the other
hand, merely holds that the instrument passed a valid title to the
donee; this result could be sustained on the theory that the power
of revocation contained in the instrument was void and like an
illegal condition subsequent could be stricken out of the instrument leaving the donee's estate absolute.2 4 It must be conceded
that there is some merit in each of these objections; the first,
because a few early cases2 do seem to hold that a deed with a
reserved power of revocation is ineffective to convey any interest
to the intended donee; the second, because other cases clearly
hold that such a deed conveys an absolute estate to the donee,
the reservation being void.26 The simplest answer to this objection is that the language of the decisions demonstrates that such
was not the reasoning of the courts; in each case the court infers
that the obvious intent of the donor would have been effectuated;
that though he could have revoked the gift at any time before he
died, the gift would become absolute at that time if the power
had not been validly exercised.
It is submitted that cases holding that a valid interest in the
property can be created in a third person after an exercise of the
reserved power come very close to true precedent for the effectiveness of these instruments to accomplish the desired result.
The cases which apparently held deeds reserving a right or power
of revocation in the grantor insufficient to convey title to the
donee are old, and the effect of most of them has been mitigated
by subsequent holdings within the same court.27 The theory of
these older decisions was that the reserved power negated the
intent required for a valid delivery; but as will be shown later
there is no logical justification for holding that such reserved
powers, in and of themselves, preclude a valid delivery. There
are decisions holding an exercise of the reserved power effective
24 1 Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, sec. 199 (3rd ed., 1939); 2 BI.
Comm. "156.
25Ellis v. Pearson, 104 Tenn. 591, 58 S.W. 318 (1900); Wren v. Coffey,
26 S.W. 142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894); Roberts v. Coleman, 37 W.Va. 143, 16 S.E.
482 (1892); Epperson v. Mills, 19 Tex. 65 (Tex. Civ. App., 1857).

"GYordy v. Yordy, 167 Kan. 211, 217 Pac. 912 (1950); Brady v. Fuller, 78
Kan. 27
448, 96 Pac. 854 (1908).
See Stewart v. 'Workman, 85 W. Va. 695, 102 S.E. 474 (1920); Stamper
v. Venable, 117 Tenn. 557, 97 S.W. 812 1906; Hamilton v. Jones, 32 Tex. 598,
75 S.V. 554 (1903).
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to defeat the donee's interes s in Alabama," Connecticut,3 0 Kentucky,3' Maryland, , Bhode Island,33 and West Virginia.34
Unfortunately the majority of the cases involving revocable
deeds of land have arisen after the death of the donor when his
heirs have generally brought suit against the donee to recover the
property. In such cases, it must be conceded, a holding in favor
28 See also Oglesby v. Lee, 73 Fla. 39, 73 So. 840 (1917) and Horn v.
Broyles, 62 S.W. 297 (Tenn. 1900), both of which held an exercise of the
reserved power effective to transfer title to the land to a third person; in neither
case, however, was the revoking grantor entitled to retain for himself the
proceeds
2 9 derived from exercising the power.
fBlackwell v. Harbin, 186 Ala. 531, 65 So. 35 (1914,, where the deed
provided: "The grantor may at any time ... cancel this deed. Grantee brought
ejectment against a subsequent purchaser from the donor. Held: For defendant
Strong's
30 Executor v. Brewer, 17 Ala. 706 (1850), discussed in text at note 22.
Bouton v. Doty, 69 Conn. 531, 37 Ati. 1064 (1897). The deed reserved
"full power to mortgage." Subsequent mortgagee from the donor sued to foreclose.
Held:31 For plaintiff.
Board of Missions of Methodist Episcopal Church, South v. Mayo, 81 F.2d
449 (6th Cir., 1936), which involved a deed to a private charity with a gift over
to a public charity upon occurrence of specified event; the deed reserved the
right to change the conveyance with the approval of the private charity. With
such approval, grantor make an absolute deed to the private charity. After the
named event occurred, the public charity sued for the land. Held: For defendant. Ricketts v. Louisville, St. L. & T. Ry. Co., 91 Ky. 221, 15 S.W. 182
(1891),
discussed in text at note 46.
32
Beranck v. Caccimaice, 157 Md. 144, 146 Atl. 369 (1929); Harmon v.

Hurst, 160 Md. 96, 153 Atd. 24 (1931); Weinbeck v. Dabms, 134 Md. 464 107
Atl. 12 (1919). In the Weinbeck case the deed reserved "the absolute right to
grant convey, sell, mortgage, limit, or dispose of the herein described property."
Donee brought ejectment against a subsequent grantee from the donor. Held:
For defendant. In the Beranck case the deed reserved the "right and privilege
to mortgage, sell or otherwise dispose of or encumber" the land. Grantor subsequently contracted to sell the land to defendant, who defaulted arguing that
title was unmarketable. Specific performance was ordered. In the Herman case
the deed reserved the power "to mortgage or sell." Grantor subsequently conveyed the land to a straw man who immediately conveyed it back. Upon the
death of the grantor his devisee sued grantee to remove cloud on title. Held:
For devisee.
33
Bradish v. Sullivan, 54 R.I. 34, 173 Atl. 117 (1934), which involved an
indenture that purported to "demise and lease" land to a mother for a term "when
the title to said property shall vest equally in their children." Donor reserved the
right "to make such changes in the terms and conditions of this lease as he may
deem desirable." Donor subsequently filed formal paper terminating the indenture
and then conveyed the property to the defendant. When the term mentioned
in the original instrument expired, one of the children brought ejectment. Held:
For defendant.
34 Steward v. Workman, 85 W. Va. 695, 102 S.E. 474 (1920); Totten v.
Pochantas Coal & Coke Co., 67 W. Va. 639, 68 S.E. 373 (1910). In the Totten
case the deed conveyed the land to several donees but reserved to donor the
right to sell the land with the consent of one of the donces. With the required
consent the donor subsequently sold the land to defendant. One of the other
donees brought suit for partition. Held: For defendant. In the Steward case, the
deed reserved the right to revoke if the donee should "become a drunkard or
uselessly involved in debt or if he should become cruel or abusive to his mother
or father." The donee subsequently deeded the land to the defendant. Donor
sued in equity to cancel the deed. The court recognized the defeasible character
of the donee s estate but dismissed the bill on the ground that ejectment was
the proper form of action.
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of the donee is equivocal; the basis of the decision could easily
be that the deed conveyed an absolute interest inter vivos and
that the power of revocation itself was void. However, language
in such decisions in Alabama,35 California, 3 Connecticut,37 In41
40
diana,3s Kentucky, 9 Massachusetts, Missouri, and Tennessee4
clearly indicates that the courts would have given effect to an
exercise of the reserved power. And in Jones v. Clifton43 the
Supreme Court of the United States recognized the validity of a
deed with a reserved power of revocation to convey the title to
the grantee, while inferring that an exercise of the power would
have been given effect.44
A conclusive answer to the objections of the technical analyst
exists in the states of Alabama, Connecticut, and Kentucky where
separate lines of decisions have held that a deed does convey a
title to the donee even though a power of revocation is reserved,
and, on the other hand, that an exercise of the reserved power is
effective to terminate that title.4 Thus in Kentucky, where there
has been an unusually long line of cases dealing with the problems
involved, the effectiveness of a reserved power to defeat the
interest of the donee was established by Ricketts v. Louisville, St.
L. & T. Ry. Co.,40 a decision that has often been cited by the
courts of other states. In this case, an elderly woman deeded
land to her son; the deed provided: "I hereby reserve to myself
the power to revoke and annul this conveyance at any time during
my natural life by a deed or other instrument under seal; ...in
33 Mays v. Burleson, 180 Ala. 896, 61 So. 75 (1918).

3

6Lowe v. Ruhlman, 67 Cal. App. 2d 828, 155 P.2d 671 (1945); Tennant v.
John Tennant Memorial Home, 167 Cal. 570, 140 Pac. 242 (1914).
37 Dennen v. Searle, 149 Conn. 126, 176 A.2d 561 (1961).
31,Kokomo Trust Co. v. Hiller, 67 Ind. App. 611, 116 N.E. 332 (1917).
39 McCampbell v. McCampbell, 178 Ky. 816, 250 S.W. 122 (1928).
40 Ricker -. Brown, 183 Mass. 424, 67 N.E. 858 (1903).
41 St. Louis County Nat. Bank v. Fielder, 864 Mo. 206, 260 S.W.2d 483
(1953).
42 Stamper v. Venable, 117 Tenn. 557, 97 S.W. 812 (1906).
43 101 U.S. 225 (1879). This case involved a deed by a husband to his wife
"for her separate use. It is frequently classified as a revocable trust case. But
it is in the transitionary period of these instruments in this country and it seems
arguable that it really involved a revocable deed of a legal interest.
44 See also Towler v. Towler, 142 N.Y. 371, 86 N.E. 869 (1894); Harty v.
Doyle, 49 Hun. 410, 3 N.Y.S. 574 (1888), where the court apparently held the
reserved power valid in so far as the conveyance was gratuitous but void to the
extent that the grantee had given consideration; Appeal of Du Bois, 22 Weekly
Nts. 286, 121 Pa. St. 868, 15 Atl. 641 (1888).
45 See cases cited in notes 29, 80, 81, 85, 87, and 89 supra.
4091 Ky. 221, 15 S.W. 182 (1891).
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the event of my exercising the said power of revocation herein
reserved, the property and title to said land to reinvest in me as
it exists at the time of the execution of this deed, any attempted
deed, alienation, or incumbrance thereon by the grantee herein
to the contrary notwithstanding." The son subsequently granted
a right of way through the land to the defendant railroad company. The mother subsequently exercised her power of revocation in the manner specified in the original deed and then brought
suit against the railroad. The court held in favor of the mother,
thus sustaining the validity of the power.4 The effectiveness of
such a deed to convey title to the grantee was established in
Kentucky by Commonwealth v. McCauley's Executors.48 In this
case the state adopted its first inheritance tax statute several
years after McCauley had executed a deed of land which reserved
to himself a life estate and a power of revocation. When McCauley died, he left a will that gave all his property to one Rock,
who was also the grantee of the revocable deed. Thus it was clear
that Rock had title to the land, but it was necessary to determine
when he received the title. The court held that no tax could be
assessed, for title had passed under the deed before the statute
had been adopted.49
There is remarkably little discussion of theory in any of the
cases that sustain the validity of such revocable gifts. It would
seem that the most logical explanation of the operation of these
deeds is that they convey a defeasible and not an absolute estate
to the grantee; the grantor retains a bare power, one that historically operated under the Statute of Uses.5 ° Upon exercise of
the power the grantee's estate is cut short and the estate becomes
vested again in the grantor 51 in the same manner that an executory
47 Other Kentucky cases recognizing the effectiveness of the power to divest
the donee's interest are Cassady v. Cain, 311 Ky. 179, 223 S.W.2d 744 (1949),
and Campbell v. Campbell, 207 Ky. 17, 268 S.W. 588 (1925).
48166 Ky. 450, 179 S.W. 411 (1915).
49 Other Kentucky cases recognizing the effectiveness of such deeds to convey
the title to the donee are: Cassady v. Cain, 311 Ky. 179, 223 S.W.2d 744 (1949);
Vaughn v. Metcalf, 2,74 Ky. 279, 118 S.W.2d 727 (1938); McCanipbell v.
McCampbell, 178 Ky. 816, 250 S.W. 122 (1923); Continental Nat. Bank of
Louisville v. McCampbell, 184 Ky. 658, 213 S.W. 193 (1919). In viev of this
line of holdings the seemingly contrary decision in Douglas v. Snow, 304 Ky. 805,
202 S.W.2d 629 (1947), should be restricted to its peculiar facts.
50 See Ricker v. Brown, 183 Mass. 424, 67 N.E. 353 (1903).
51 St. Louis County Nat. Bank v. Fielder, 364 Mo. 206, 260 S.W.2d 483
(1953); Kokomo Trust Co. v. Hiller, 67 Ind. App. 611, 116 N.E. 332 (1917);
Tennant v. John Tennant Memorial Home, 167 Cal. 570, 140 Pac. 242 (1914).
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interest becomes possessory and that an appointee's expectancy
matures into an estate. 2 Thus it is seen that the power of revocation is clearly analagous to, if not merely a special type of, the
common power of appointment. Indeed, if he so desired, it seems
clear that the grantor could accomplish his purpose merely by
conveying the property to a straw man 53 who would then execute
a conveyance to the intended donee with a general power of
appointment in the donor.
When these transactions are viewed in this light, it will be
seen that the language used in many of these instruments and
cases to the effect that the reservation is a "power to revoke the
deed" is inaccurate. The deed is not and cannot be revoked.
The power operates only upon the estate of the grantee and even
it is not revoked; it is merely terminated by the act which constitutes an exercise of the power. In the same way, the phrase
"revocable gift" is somewhat misleading. Technically the gift is
not revoked when the power is exercised. It is still effective
according to its original terms. But since the gift encompassed
only a defeasible title and since the defeating event has now
occurred, the gift no longer has much practical significance to the
parties. Though the term is thus somewhat inaccurate, it will
continue to be used throughout the rest of this study; for it has
become popular and does convey a clear picture of the nontechnical effect of these transactions.
It might be well to also point out that it seems perfectly
proper for a court to construe an instrument as creating a
defeasible estate subject to a power even though very inept
language has been used by the grantor. Thus deeds reciting that
part of the consideration is "that grantee will deed back . . .
when called for so to do" 4 or "that grantor may at any time or
for any cause that he may think proper cancel this deed," 55 deeds
52 See Bouton v. Doty, 69 Conn. 531, 37 AtI. 1064 (1897). Technically it is
incorrect to call the revoking grantor's estate an executory interest, as the court
did in this case. A grantor cannot limit an executory interest in himself. However,
the estate which arises upon exercise of the power is analagous to an executory
interest. See Simes and Smith, The Law of Future Interests, sees. 224, 226 (2d
ed., 1956).
53
This method was actually used in Mardin v. Leimback, 115 Md. 208, 80
AUt. 958 (1911). It would seem that the straw man in unnecessary for reserved
powers of appointment have been recognized as valid. See Simes and Smith, op.
cit. supra note 52, at see. 878.
54 Stamper v. Venable, 117 Tenn. 557, 97 S.W. 812 (1906).
55 Blackwell v. Harbin, 186 Ala. 531, 65 So. 35 (1914).
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purportedly reserving "the right to revoke and annul this conveyance," 56 or "the right to change the conveyance in any and all
of its terms,"57 and deeds "upon condition" 8 or "provided that I
do not sell"59 have been construed to create such estates."' This
type of power originated in the Court of Chancery which looked
at the substance and not the form.6 ' As long as the intention of
the parties is clear, the court should have little difficulty in
effectuating it in this manner; for it is well established that no
special words are necessary to create a power.02
Some early cases, however, effectuated attempts at revocable
gifts by construing the deeds as conveying estates subject to a
condition. Thus in Blanchard v. Morey ' 3 the donors reserved a
life estate and the deed expressly provided that it "is not to be
binding upon us ... if in any case we should want or need to

sell a part of all of said real estate in order to maintain us."
Subsequently, the donors mortgaged the land to plaintiff to buy
necessities. This was a bill to foreclose the mortgage. The court
said:
The right to support and to sell for their necessities was a
provision in the nature of a condition of absolute defeasance.
If the grantees wished the conveyance to become absolute,
they were bound to see that no occasion should arise for the
grantors to sell for their necessities.
The court held that the fact that the donors had had to mortgage
the land for necessities showed a breach of the condition; since
the donors were already in possession, the estate automatically
revested in them without any formal act; and hence, the mortgage
was a valid encumbrance on the estate. Since the defeating
event in this case was not completely at the will of the donors,
56 Stewart v. Workman, 85 W. Va. 695, 102 S.E. 474 (1920); Ricketts v.
Louisville, St. L. & T. By. Co., 91 Ky. 221, 15 S.W. 182 (1891).
57 Board of Missions of Methodist Episcopal Church, South v. Mayo, 81 F.2d
449 (6th Cir. 1936); Bradish v. Sullivan, 54 R.I. 34, 173 AUt. 117 (1934).
58 Vaughn v. Metcalf, 274 Ky. 279, 118 S.W.2d 727 (1938).
59
Mays v. Burleson, 180 Ala. 896, 61 So. 75 (1913).
0Se also the language used in Cassady v. Cain, 311 Ky. 179, 223 S.W.2d
744 (1949); Weinbeck v. Dams, 134 Md. 464. 107 AU. 12 (1919); Kokomno
Trust Co. v. Hiller, 67 Ind. App. 611, 116 N.E. 332 (1917).
612 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 378 ff. (5th ed., 1941).
6
2 Simes and Smith, op. cit. supra note 52, at sec. 892.
63 56 Vt. 170 (1883).
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it is easier to justify this decision than some of the others that
speak of the reservation as a condition.
Though no case has been found in which the outcome depended upon a choice between the two theories, viewing these
reservations as creating powers rather than conditions has several
advantages. In the first place it must be remembered that
whether or not the event on which a conditional estate depends
can be within the sole will of the grantor is doubtful.65 Construing the reservation as a power obviates this problem; for such
an event is clearly a proper subject for a power. But the major
advantage in this construction is that it makes it clearer that the
reservation dies with the donor unless he takes advantage of it
during his lifetime. Most powers are personal, and we are
accustomed to seeing unexercised powers extinguished at the
deaths of their holders. 6 Thus when the reservation is viewed
as a power, we more or less instinctively recognize its personal
character and have little difficulty in concluding that, unless the
power has been previously exercised, the gift becomes irrevocable
and the donee's estate indefeasible upon the donor's death. But
if the reservation is viewed as a condition, then the donor has a
right of entry rather than a power; 17 and since rights of entry
generally descend upon the deaths of their owners,68 it might be
thought that a donor's heirs or devisees would succeed upon his
death to his unexercised right and could by their own act still
terminate the interest of the donee and revoke the gift. Such a
holding would almost certainly frustrate the donor's intent for it
would inevitably lead to the eventual revocation of the gift-if
not by his heirs, then by his heirs' heirs. 9 Though it is submitted
that such a result would not necessarily follow from viewing
04 E.g., Bradish v. Sullivan, 54 R.I. 34 173 Atl. 117 (1934); Ricketts v.
Louisville, St. L. & T. By. Co., 91 Ky. 221, 15 S.V. 182 (1891).
65 See text supra at note 2.

C Simes and Smith, op. cit. supra note 52, at sec. 943.
6T See 2 Restatement, Property, see. 55 (1936).
08 2 Restatement, Property, sec. 164 (1936). For the exceptions to this
majority rule, see Simes and Smith, op. cit. supra note 52, at sec. 1884.
GORits of entry are not subject to the rule against perpetuities and thus may
encumber the title to property from generation to generation. See Sisnes and
Smnith, op. cit. supra note 52, at sec. 1238. There are, of course, statutes in
some states that limit the duration of rights of entry; see Current Trends in State
Legislation, 1953-1954, pgs. 589-644.
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these reservations as conditions,70 the fact that the donees estate
remains defeasible only so long as the donor lives is somewhat
easier to establish when the reservation is viewed as creating a
power.71 For these reasons Stamper v. Venable,72 which expressly
held the reservation to create a power rather than a condition,
seems sound.
It must not be assumed that the validity of revocable deeds
is established in all states. In Newell v. McMillan73 a Kansas
court, while referring to what it apparently considered to be a
power of revocation,74 said that it was "so clearly void as not to
be a fair subject for debate among competent lawyers." This line
of precedent dates back to an early and often cited Georgia case,
Daniel v. Veal.75 This case involved a deed of personalty which
expressly reserved to the maker "the right of revoking this deed
of gift." After the donor's death, his administrator claimed the
property as part of decedents estate, and the donee brought suit
to establish her right. The court came to a sound conclusion by
holding in favor of the donee, but the theory of the court was

that the deed conveyed an absolute title to the donee when it
was executed. The court said:
Our opinion is, that this clause reserving the right of revocation, is inconsistent with the operative portion of the instrument; incompatible with the estate conveyed, and therefore
void.
70 Even if the reservation creates a right of entry, the conditioning event
could be construed to be a revocation by the donor personally. Thus at his death
without having revoked the gift, the right would be extinguished for then it
would no longer be possible for the conditioning event to occur. See 1 American
Law of Property, sec. 4.76 (1952).
71 Construing the reservation as creating a power also simplifies the resolution of another problem that has occasionally arisen. In Green v. Votaw, 192
Okla. 136, 186 P.2d 367 (1943), the court indicated that when property is owned
by one spouse individually, the reservation of a power to revoke by the other
spouse is void because a reservation cannot be made to a stranger. See also In
re Young, 11 R.I. 636 (1877). Though this argument has some merit when
the reservation is construed as a condition, it is wholly inapplicable when the
reservation is construed as creating a power; for powers are not interests in
property and no special words of grant are necessary to create them.
72117 Tenn. 557, 97 S.W. 812 (1906). Other cases indicating that the
reservation is a power are: St. Louis County Nat. Bank v. Fielder, 364 Mo. 206,
260 S.W.2d 483 (1953); Tennant v. John Tennant Memorial Home, 167 Cal. 570,
140 Pac. 242 (1914); Bicker v. Brown, 183 Mass. 424, 67 N.E. 353 (1903).
73 139 Kan. 94, 30 P.2d 126 (1934).
74
Though the language of the court infers that the case involved simply a
revocable gift, a careful reading of the reservations indicates that the grantor
was really trying to restrain the power of alienation,
75 32 Ga. 589 (1861).
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Since this case arose in a period when the possibility of creating
future interests in personalty was none too clear,76 it would seem
that it might be easily distinguished from cases involving similar

deeds of realty. This distinction has not been drawn, and the case
has been cited in cases involving deeds of land. 77 Though several

subsequent cases in Georgia 78 have involved similar revocable
deeds, the present rule in this state is doubtful. None of these
cases has placed in issue the effectiveness of an exercise of the

reserved power to defeat the interest of the donee; all have simply
involved the effectiveness of the deed to convey the interest to the
donee. They have all come to a fair conclusion by holding the
gifts valid, but it is interesting to note that the most recent

decision79 cites authority which is based on Ricketts v. Louisville
St. L. & T. Ry. Co., supra, and does not mention Daniel v. Veal,

supra.
Though the status of powers of revocation in deeds of legal
interests in land in Georgia is doubtful, their invalidity in Kansas
is clear. In Durandv. Higgins0 a deed of land was held effective
to convey title to the grantees under reasoning that inferred that
the attempted reservation of a right of revocation was void. In
Lacy v. Comstock"' the court seemed to give effect to an exercise

of a reserved power to revoke; 82 but several years later in Brady v.
Fullers the court clearly held that such reserved power was void
and that an exercise of it could not create an estate in another in
derogation of the estate of the original donee. In this latter case
a mother deeded land to her daughter "reserving however to
herself an estate for and during her natural life ... and further
76 See Simes and Smith, op. cit. supra note 52, at see. 351 ff.

77
Price v. Gross, 148 Ga. 137, 96 S.E. 4 (1918); Hamilton v. Cargily, 127
Ga. 762,
56 S.E. 1022 (1907).
78
Smith v. Smith, 167 Ga. 363, 145 S.E. 661 (1928); Simpson v. Powell Co.,
158 Ga. 516, 123 S.E. 741 (1924); Price v. Gross, 148 Ga. 137, 96 S.E. 4 (1918);
Shelton i. Edenfield, 148 Ga. 128, 96 S.E. 3 (1918); Hamilton v. Cargile, 127
Ga. 762,
7 9 56 S.E. 1022 (1907); Dye v. Dye, 108 Ga. 741, 33 S.E. 848 (1899).
Smit v. Smith, 167 Ga. 368, 145 S.E. 661 (1928).
67 Kan. 110, 72 Pac. 567 (1903). The deed was absolute upon its face
but the grantor took from the grantees a separate written instrument reserving
"the right to sell and convey the whole or any part thereof the same as though
a deed had never been given."
M155 Kan. 86, 39 Pac. 1024 (1895).
l 2 This decision is equivocal, but its theory must be that the deed conveyed
no title to the donee. Else the donor revoked the gift by will though he reserved
only the right to revoke by "deed, during his lifetime."
S3 78 Kan. 448, 96 Pac. 859 (1908).
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reserving to herself the power to mortgage, incumber, sell, lease,
convey or otherwise dispose of said real estate at any time." The
mother subsequently deeded the same land to the daughter and
another. After the mother's death, the other grantee of the second
deed sought partition of the land. The court held that the
reservation must be construed as affecting only the life estate of
the mother; for if applied to the fee, the reservation "would
necessarily fail." The court has recently come to a similar conclusion in Thorn v. Thorn. 4
The possibility of such revocable gifts has been questioned
in one aspect or another in other states also.

5

Sometimes courts

have not been entirely consistent in their approach to such instruments; holding in one case that the instrument is ineffective to
convey any estate, and in the next that it conveys an absolute
title that cannot be revoked. This appears to have happened
in Texas in two cases"6 less than ten years apart.
In these cases casting doubt upon the validity of such revocable gifts, there is the same absence of discussion of principle
that characterizes the cases that sustain their validity. Though
a few cases seem to hold that the reserved power prevents the
disposition from having any effect, the commoner result is that
the reservation is void, and thus, the donee's estate absolute. The
explanation often found in the decisions is that the reservation is
"repugnant"; but the cases do not always make it clear why the
reservation is thought to be repugnant. As pointed out recently
by the Supreme Court of Missouri,"7 certainly it is not repugnant
in the same sense that similar conditions were said to be so at
common law; the Statute of Uses evidenced a change in the
policy that required all transfers of land to be completed by
public ceremony, and modem recording acts have removed all
the reasons on which the supposed rule was founded.
84 171 Kan. 651, 237 P.2d 250 (1954). In Yordy v. Yordy, 169 Kan. 211,
217 P.2d 912 (1950), the court did not pass upon the validity of the reserved
power, but was content merely to hold that if valid it had not been properly
exercised.
85 Ellis v. Pearson, 104 Tenn. 591, 58 S.W. 318 (1900); Roberts v. Coleman,
37 W.Va. 143, 16 S.E. 482 (1892); Cunningham v. Davis, 62 Miss. 366 (1884);
In re Young, 11 R.I. 636 (1877).
86 Hamilton v. Jones, 32 Tex. 598, 75 S.W. 554 (1903); and Wren v. Coffey,
26 S.W. 142 (Tex. Civ. App., 1894).
87 St. Louis County Nat. Bank v. Fielder, 364 Mo. 206, 260 S.W.2d 483

(1953).
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It would seem that many courts feel that such reservations
are repugnant to "the estate conveyed." The fallacy of such
doctrines of repugnancy has been pointed out so frequently and
so well in other circumstances"' that it hardly seems necessary
to point out that this reasoning completely begs the issue; no
conclusion can be reached under this doctrine unless it is assumed
that the "repugnant" incident is a necessary characteristic of the
estate conveyed. The cases applying this doctrine wholly fail to
recognize that the donee's estate is qualified and not absolute.
The power of revocation is merely a special limitation which like
any other shifting use takes effect in derogation of the preceding
estate. Certainly no court today would hold a shifting use void
because of such "repugnancy."
It seems clear that when some courts refer to the doctrine of
"repugnancy," they are using the term in a different sense.
At
common law, a highly artificial rule prevailed in the interpretation
of the various parts of a deed; it was often held that an estate
specifically limited in the granting clause could not be cut down
to a less estate by the language of the habendum. s9 Under this
rule it would be logical to hold a power of revocation void if the
language of the granting clause conveyed an absolute estate, i.e.,
unless some language was incorporated in the granting clause
indicating reservations would be subsequently mentioned 0 The
severity of this rule of construction has been mitigated through
the years, and most courts now seek to reconcile apparently
repugnant provisions by determining the true intention of the
parties. " ' Thus it would seem that regardless of where the reserved power is inserted, its effect in qualifying the estate conveyed should be recognized if the intention of the parties is
s Williams, Doctrine of Repugnancy, Conditions in Gifts, 59 Law Q. Rev.
343 (1943); Simes and Smith, The Law of Future Interests, see. 1133 (2d ed.,
1956).
2. 2 B1. Comm. *298; Throckmorton v. Tracy, 1 Plowd. 145, 75 Eng. Rep.

222.

90This is clearly the argument in Durand v. Higgins, supra note 80. The rule
was also recognized in Tennant v. John Tennant Memorial Home, 167 Cal. 570,
140 Pac. 242 (1914), but was held inapplicable "because the granting clause
itself, declares that it is 'subject to' the reservations." However, this doctrine does
not explain all of the cases; e.g., in Brady v. Fuller and Thorn v. Thorn, supra
notes 83 and 84, the reservation was mentioned in the granting clause.
91 4 Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, sec. 950 (3d ed., 1939); 3 American
Law of Property, see. 12.95 (1952); Healey, Conflicts Between Granting and
Habendum Clauses, 11 N.Y.U. Int. L. Rev. 201 (1956).
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clear. 92 But even this modem rule has not been applied with the
same liberality by all courts. Most courts seek to ascertain the
intention by considering the instrument as a whole;93 others have
gone outside the instrument itself and considered the whole
transaction as evidenced by other documents between the parties;9 4 and still others, being swayed by a desire to give some
effect to every part of the instrument, have concluded that all
inconsistencies must be resolved by considering only the parts
in apparent conflict. 95 This latter method of construction might
be the explanation for such holdings as Brady v. Fuller, supra,
and Thorn v. Thorn, supra, where the donors reserved life estates
and the right to convey, and the courts concluded that the power
to convey applied only to the reserved life estates. Care in the
drafting of revocable deeds should obviate any difficulty with
these doctrines of repugnancy.
There is yet another doctrine of "repugnancy" which might
be applied to revocable deeds. Courts have often had difficulty
with deeds and wills that purport to give a possessory estate to
one and limit a future interest to another while at the same time
investing the first taker with an absolute power of disposition,
e.g., a devise to testator's wife, with express or implied power of
disposal, followed by a gift over of "what remains" to testators
heirs. Though some states held such future interests void even
when the conveyance expressly limited a life estate to the holder
of the power,96 most courts held them valid unless a fee was
created in such first taker. 97 Many explanations of the reasons
for the rule have been proposed; none of them very convincing s
92

'Instead of a life estate, a grantor may reserve.. .a power of sale, or a
right to revoke the conveyance during his lifetime, or a life estate coupled with
a power of sale.
The matter of repugnancy must be determined from a consideration
of the entire instrument. An intention of the grantor to destroy the effect of his
own conveyance is so foreign to his probable purpose that a construction of
repugnancy will be made only when no other is possible." Americal Law of
Property, sec. 12.95 (1952).
93 Carter Oil Co. v. Weil, 209 Ark. 653, 192 S.W.2d 215 (1945), noted in 2
Ark. L. Rev. 114 (1947); Triplett v. Williams, 194 N.C. 394, 63 S.E. 79 (1908);
Ratliffe
v. Marse, 87 Ky. 26, 7 S.W. 345 (1888).
94
Weir v. Brigham, 218 Ark. 354, 236 S.W.2d 435 (1951).
95
96 See Whetstone v. Hunt, 78 Ark. 230, 93 S.W. 979 (1906).
Michigan, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia held any interest following a life estate with an unlimited power of disposal void. See Annotations, 36
A.L.R. 1218 (1925), 76 A.L.R. 1166 (1932).
97 See cases cited in Annotations, 36 A.L.R. 1177 (1925), 76 A.L.R. 1153
(1932).
98
Simes and Smith, The Law of Future Interests, sec. 1484 (2d ed., 1956).
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is that the interest is
But one of the reasons often suggested
"repugnant" after such an estate. 9 It is conceivable that such an
argument might be applied to some revocable deeds. In most of
the cases that have been considered the donor did not convey a
possessory estate to the donee upon execution of the deed.
Usually he retained not only a power of revocation but also a life
estate. These cases should present no difficulty today, for the
few states that held the rule applicable to life tenants with
absolute powers of disposition have since repudiated at least this
application of it."" However, in an attempt to relieve themselves
from a possible suit for waste, donors often seek to retain more
than a life estate when making a disposition which is to take
effect in possession at their deaths; many courts have effectuated
this intent by construing such deeds as reserving a defeasible fee
in the grantor rather than a mere life estate.'1 1 If the maker of a
revocable deed were to use such broad language as to create a
defeasible fee in himself, it is conceivable that this same doctrine
of repugnancy would be applicable to it; 10 2 for then the donee's

interest would be following a fee estate to which has been added
an absolute power of disposition-the power of revocation being
analagous to, if not the same as, an absolute power of disposition.
Though this rule has been limited by judicial decision' 0 3 in some
states and abrogated by statute'0 4 in others, it is still applied in
some jurisdictions' 0 5 and could be utilized in striking down such
revocable deeds. 00
9
9 Even though the courts so hold, there is no apparent reason why such an
interest is any more "repugnant" than other shifting uses. See Leflar, Validity of
Future
100Interests Cutting Short Fee Simple Estates, 8 Tenn. L. Rev. 73 (1930).
Simes and Smith, op. cit. supra note 98, at see. 1488.
101 See Dennis v. West, 248 Ala. 90, 26 So. 2d 263 (1946); Watts v. Watts,
198 Miss. 246, 22 So. 2d 625 (1945); Turner v. Montgomery, 283 S.W. 815 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1927); Bradley v. Bradley, 185 Iowa 1272, 171 N.W. 729 (1919);
Fritz, The Texas Law of Conveyancing, sees. 26, 38, printed in 3 Vernon's Ann.
Rev. Civil Stats. of Texas (1962).
162 Apparently this argument was made in Cassady v. Cain, 311 Ky. 179, 223
S.W.2d 744 (1949), but the court held the language reserved only a life
estate with the power of revocation.
1o3 Simes and Smith, The Law of Future Interests, sec. 1487 (2d ed., 1956).
14 Simes and Smith, op. cit. supra note 103, at sec. 1491.
105 E.g., in Missouri. Vaughn v. Compton, 361 Mo. 467, 235 S.W.2d 328
(1950); 17 Mo. L. Rev. 177 (1952).
10 This poses a serious problem for the draftsman who wishes to protect
a donor's estate from any possible claim by the donee for waste. Of course there
is no fear of such suit during life while the power of revocation is stl exercisable.
But after the donor's death some donee might seek to press such a claim against
his estate. Though no case has been found involving the point, it is suggested

(Continued on next page)
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It might be thought that revocable deeds would run afoul of
the policy of the law that prohibits undue restraints on alienation.
In several recent cases1 7 Kansas courts seemed to indicate this

line of thought. It is submitted, however, that this problem is not
really raised by these instruments. Land which has been conveyed by a deed that reserves a power of revocation remains
freely alienable by the grantor at any time he sees fit; all he
needs to do is exercise his reserved power. And the donee is
also free to alienate his interest to whomever he sees fit and
whenever he pleases. The reserved power will of course encumber the estate in the hands of his transferee (except, possibly, in the case of a bonafide purchaser); and this fact will in
practice probably curtail his opportunities of alienating the
property, for it will be difficult to find any one willing to buy an
interest so easily defeated. But such is the nature of most qualified estates. In this respect, a deed containing a power of revocation is very similar to a deed containing an option to repurchase
at a nominal price. The grantee of neither deed will probably be
able to find any one willing to purchase his interest. Yet such
options are clearly valid if limited to the period of the rule against
perpetuities; 08 and it is submitted that the same should also be
true of such powers of revocation.
There is yet another objection to the effectiveness of these
revocable gifts that might be raised. Unlike the objections
previously considered this argument would recognize the validity
of the reserved power but would automatically terminate the
donee's interest at the death of the donor. The basis of this
argument is a statement by Lord Coke to the effect that a tenancy
at the will of one party is at the will of both. 109 Under this
doctrine it has been held that an estate that is terminable at the
(Footnotes continued from preceding page)

that an analogy to the trust cases might be drawn and the donee might be
precluded from suing for any act authorized or done by the holder of the power.
See City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon, 291 N.Y. 125, 51 N.E.2d 674
(1943). Thus, in view of the possibility that the reservation of too large a
possessory estate might defeat the whole transaction and in view of this possible
defense in the event of such a subsequent suit, it is submitted that it would
probably be better to reserve only a life estate with the power to revoke.
107 If the court did not confuse a power of revocation with a restraint on
alienation in Newell v. McMillan, 139 Kan. 94, 30 P.2d 126 (1934), it certainly
equated them in Zaskey v. Farrow, 159 Kan. 347, 154 P.2d 1013 (1945) and
Yordy v. Yordy, 169 Kan. 211, 217 P.2d 912 (1950), by citing the Newell case.
108 6 American Law of Property, sees. 24.56, 24.66 (1952).
10 9 Co. Litt. "55a.
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wvill of one party is merely a tenancy at will which is personal
in nature and automatically terminated by the death of either
party."' It is submitted that this doctrine presents little difficulty
to sustaining the validity of revocable deeds. It is generally held
today that the rule is inapplicable to estates that have a designated period of duration other than the will of the parties. Thus
a deed that expressly limits a life estate or a fee to the grantee
could not be held to create only a tenancy at will, even though
the estate is expressly made defeasible at the will of the grantor.
Concerning this matter the Restatement of Property provides:
The fact that an estate is created subject to a special limitation
by the terms of which the happening of the event upon
...
which the limitation ... is to operate depends upon the will
of the transferor of the estate does not necessarily cause the
created estate to be an estate at will. Whether this result
follows or not presents a problem in construction."'
Of course a revocable deed that does not expressly limit a definite
estate to the donee would present difficulties of construction that
might compel a court to conclude that only an estate at will was
created.
There are statutes in many states that seem to recognize the
validity of powers of revocation in deeds of legal interests. Thus
when originally codifying their law of powers, the New York
legislators adopted the following provision, which has been
copied into the laws of many other states:"
The grantor in a conveyance may reserve to himself any power,
beneficial or in trust, which he might lawfully grant to another ....

13

Since a grantor may give a general power of appointment to one
party while conveying an estate to another, this statute clearly
110 Lepsch v. Lepsch, 275 App. Div. 412, 90 N.Y.S. 2d 157 (1949); Say v.
Stoddard, 27 Ohio St. 478 (1875); Richardson v. Langridge, 4 Taunt. 128, 128
Eng. Rep. 277 (Corn. PI. 1811).
111 Sec. 21, corn. b. See also 2 Powell, The Law of Real Property, see. 256

(1950).

112, a. Code (1940) tit. 47, sec. 80; D. C. Code (1961) tit. 45, sec. 1009;
Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) sec. 26.123; N. D. Century Code 1959) tit. 59, see.
1516; 60 Okla. Stat. Ann. (Vest 1963) see. 195; S. D. Code (1939) tit. 59, sec.
0415; Vise. Stat. Ann. (West 1957) 232.32.
113 This formerly was section 144 of the N.Y. Real Property Law (McKinney
1945). It was recently repealed in a general revision of this part of the code.
The reviion apparently, however, did not materially alter the substantive rule
of law. See N. Y. Laws 1964, c. 864, see. 132.
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authorizes him to reserve such a power to himself. But when
such a power is reserved to the grantor, it would seem that it is
merely a power of revocation; for it enables him to divest the
grantee's estate and vest it in himself, thus revoking the gift.
Thus the statute clearly seems to authorize the reservation of a
power of revocation in the grantor of any type of conveyance.
The deleterious effect such reservations might have upon the
grantor's creditors was soon recognized and to remedy the situation the New York legislature adopted the following statute,
which also has been copied into the statutes of other states:11 4
Where the grantor in a conveyance reserves to himself for his
own benefit, an absolute power of revocation, he is to be still
deemed the absolute owner of the estate conveyed, so far as
the rights of creditors and purchasers are concerned.115
This provision expressly recognizes the power of revocation by
name and it infers the effectiveness of revocable deeds to accomplish the desired result by specifying one instance in which the
grantor shall still be "deemed" to be the owner. The natural
inference from the statutory language is that, in all cases where
the rights of creditors and purchasers are not concerned, the
grantor is no longer the absolute owner of the property, and the
deed is effective to pass a valid title to the donee. This inference
is bolstered by the reviser's notes to this section; indeed, these
notes also demonstrate that an exercise of the reserved power
was considered to be effective to divest the estate of the donee.
The notes say, in part:
As to the creation of powers: There are at present no limits;
but the owner may separate from the title the whole or any
portion of his authority, in the disposition of his lands, and
retain it to himself or vest it in another. Thus a man may
convey his estate in fee, and by means of a power of revocation, continue in himself the absolute dominion, leaving only
a naked title to the alienee. By this device, the lands are
11 4 Ala. Code (1940) tit. 47, see. 75; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1961) sec. 56610; Kan. Gen. Stat. (1949) sec. 67-414; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) see. 26.104;
Minn. Stat. (1953) see. 502.76; N. D. Century Code (1959) tit. 59, sec. 0535; 60
Okla. Stat. Ann. (West 1968) see. 267; S. D. Code (1939) tit. 59, sec. 0444;
Wisc. Stat. Ann. (West 1957) 232.13.
115 This formerly was section 145 of the N. Y. Real Property Law (McKinney
1945). The recent revision of this part of the New York statutes retains substantially the same language. See N. Y. Laws 1964, c. 864, sec. 163.
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placed effectually beyond the reach... of the creditors of the
grantee.... (T)hey may always be defeated by an exercise
of the power of revocation. 116
These same arguments can be drawn from New York Real Property Law, see. 267, which provides:
A conveyance of, or charge on, an estate or interest in real
property, containing a provision for the revocation, determination or alteration of the estate or interest, or any part thereof,
at the will of the grantor, is void, as against subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers, from the grantor, for a valuable
consideration, of any estate or interest so liable to be revoked
or determined....
117
This statute also has its counterpart in other states.

Mention has already been made of the difficulties courts have
had with future interests following estates whose holders also
have an absolute power of disposition. The commonest statutory
provisions that have been adopted to meet this situation are
patterned on what formerly was New York Real Property Law,
sees. 149 and 150:
Where an absolute power of disposition, not accompanied by
a trust, is given to the owner of a particular estate for life
or for years, such estate is changed into a fee simple absolute
in respect to the rights of creditors, purchasers and incumbrancers, but subject to any future estates limited thereon, in
case the power of absolute disposition is not executed, and
the property is not sold for the satisfaction of debts.
Where a like power of disposition is given to a person to
whom no particular estate is limited, such person also takes
a fee, subject to any future estates that may be limited thereon, but absolute in respect to creditors, purchasers and incumbrancers.
The language of these statutes seems easily applicable to revocable deeds in which the donor retains some possessory estate;
116 Printed in 3 New York Revised Statutes 889 (2d ed., 1836).
17 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) c. 59, see. 59-1-3; Fla. Stat. (1944) sec.
726.88; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums 1949) see. 33-404; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948)
see. 26.903; Minn. Stat. Ann. (1953) see. 513.09; Nev. Rev. Stat. (1957) sec.
11.185; N. J. Stats. Ann. (West 1940) tit. 25, sec. 2-4; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) c.
95, sec. 95.030; S. C. Code (1962) tit. 57, sec. 309; Wise. Stat. Ann. (West
1957) 240.03. For similar statutes from which the same inference could also be
drawn, see Cal. Civ. Code (Deering 1949) see. 1229; Idaho Code (1948) see.
55-903; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) it. 29, see. 203; N. D. Century Code
(1959) tit. 59, see. 0559; S. D. Code (1939) tit. 51, see. 1407.
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the power of revocation is certainly an absolute power of disposition within the meaning of these laws. The first part of each
section implies that the power may be validly exercised at least
in favor of a purchaser; and the latter part seems to provide that
the donee's interest is valid in the absence of an exercise of the
power. These sections expressly exclude trust cases and thus are
clearly applicable to deeds of legal interests. There are similar
statutory provisions in other states."8
In Tenant v. Iohn Tennant Memorial Home"1 9 the court suggested another common statutory provision that seems to infer
that revocable deeds of land are valid and can be used to
effectuate the intention of the parties. The statute read:
A future interest may be defeated in any manner or by any act
or means which the party creating such interest provided for
or authorized in the creation thereof; nor is a future interest
thus liable to be defeated, to be on that ground adjudged void
in its creation.
Though this statute was originally merely a part of a larger one
designed primarily to prevent the destruction of contingent
remainders under the technical rules of the common law, it now
enjoys a separate existence in many states.120 The language is
quite broad and appears to authorize the creator of a future
interest to provide in the instrument creating it for its destruction
"in any manner or by any act or means." It would not appear
to place too much strain on these words to interpret them to
include a reserved power of revocation.
In this same case the court relied upon a basic premise of our
118 Ala. Code (1940) tit. 47, sees. 76, 77; D. C. Code (1961) tit. 45, sees.
1005, 1006; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) see. 26.99, 26.100; N. D. Century Code
(1959) tit. 59, sees. 0539, 0540; 60 Okla. Stat. Ann. (West 1963) sees. 262, 263;
S. D. Code (1939) tit. 59, sees. 0439, 0440; Tenn. Code Ann. (1955) see. 7603;
Va. Code (1950) tit. 55, sees. 55-7, wording differs greatly; Wise. Stat. Ann.
(West 1957) 232.08, 232.09.
119 167 Cal. 570, 140 Pae. 242 (1914).
120See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (1956) tit. 71, sec. 116; Cal. Civ. Code (Deering
1949) sec. 740; D. C. Code (1961) tit. 45, sec. 814; Mass. Gen. Laws (Ter. Ed.)
c. 284, see. 11; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) sec. 26.33; Minn. Stat. (1953) see.
500.15; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) tit. 67, see. 418; N. Y. Real Prop. Law
(McKinney 1945) sec. 57; N. D. Century Code (1959) tit. 47, see. 0228; Ohio
Rev. Code (Baldwin 1953) sec. 2131.06; R. I. Gen. Laws (1956) c. 433, sec. 5;
S. D. Code (1939) tit. 51, see. 0228; Wise. Stat. Ann (West 1957) 230.32. The
language of some of these statutes is more easily susceptible than others to this
interpretation.
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system of private ownership to justify the validity of revocable
deeds. The court said:
The right to acquire and possess property, guaranteed by the
Constitution, includes the right to dispose of it, or any part
of it, and for that purpose to divide it in any possible manner.
... It also includes the right to impose upon the grant of such
estates any reservations or conditions which the grantor may
see fit to place in the grant. The only limitation upon these
rights is that they must be exercised in a way not forbidden
by law.
This argument is basically sound and convincing. However, it
must be recognized that the right of free disposition is limited
not only by express prohibitions against specific transactions but
-also by certain policy considerations that are present in our legal
system. Some of these considerations are designed to protect
owners from fraudulent or hasty acts by giving effect only to
those dispositions executed in such a way as to evidence, not
only that they are in fact the act of the owner, but also that his
intentions were sufficienfly mature and deliberate to be given
legal effect. Others are designed to protect third parties who
might subsequently come into contact with the property, subsequent creditors and purchasers from the donor or donee. The
next two chapters will discuss these considerations.

Chapter III: Are Revocable Deeds Testamentary?
Soon after the Statute of Wills conferred upon Englishmen
the right to dispose of the legal title to their landed wealth by
will, Lord Coke recommended the use of revocable gifts as a
more satisfactory method of accomplishing the same result. He
said:
And touching wills, whereof you have much good matter in
the said case of Butler and Baker, my advice to all who have
lands is, that you take care by the advice of learned counsel,
by act executed, to make assurances of your lands according
to your true intent, in full health and memory; to which
assurances you may add such conditions or provisoes of
revocation as you please. For I find great doubts and controversies daily arise on devises made by last wills, sometimes
inrespect . . .of obscure and insensible words, and repugnant sentences, the will being made in haste; and some pretend
that the testator, in respect of extreme pain, was not compos
mentis, and divers other scruples and questions are moved
upon wills.'
Cases in which the reasonable desires of a testator are thwarted
for the reasons mentioned by Coke in this passage still occur
with distressing frequency. And to these uncertainties of probate,
other reasons for seeking another means of disposing of wealth
among one's survivors may be added today; predominantly the
delays and expenses often encountered in probate and administration. Though many reforms have been made in this field since
the renowned case of Jarndyce v. Iarndyce,2 the Anglo-American
system of administering the estate of a decedent is something less
than a tribute to the ingenuity of our ancestors. There seems
little sense in tying up a decedents property for a lengthy period
of time merely to secure payment of his debts. Certainly everyone
will agree that the creditors must be paid. But does this justify
the impoverishment of the surviving dependents for a year while
the court satisfies itself that there are no unknown creditorswhich is usually the case?
1 Butler & Baker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 25a, 76 Eng. Rep. 684. 709 (1591).
2 This fictitious case "drones on" through most of Bleak House until the costs
completely exhaust the property in suit. That Dickens did not unduly exaggerate
the delays and expenses encountered in Chancery during the early part of the
nineteenth century, see Holdsworth, Charles Dickens as a Legal Historian, 79-119

(1929).
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Thus, it is no wonder that many seek to find a means of distributing, at least, some of their property among their survivors
that is free of the pitfalls often encountered in probate and
administration. 3 The revocable deed of gift seems to be the
natural answer to such quest, for the practical effects of such a
deed are very similar to those of a will. The property does not
pass completely beyond the reach of the donor until his death.
Should financial reverses or changed social relations necessitate
the reclamation of the property, the donor may do so at any time
during his life merely by exercising his power of revocation; he
need fear no costly or time-consuming court action in this respect
for he need offer no reason, explanation, or justification to any
one for exercising his reserved power. Yet if the power is not
exercised, the donee's estate becomes absolute and indefeasible
at the moment of the donor's death without the need of any
further act or formality.
When the revocable deed is viewed in this light, when it is
frankly admitted that it might be used as a substitute for a will,
the most serious questions as to its validity are faced. Is not such
a gift testamentary? If not, is it not invalid simply as an evasion
of the Wills Act?
Though courts have at times inclined toward the view that
an intent to avoid probate will render a disposition invalid, the
better rule today is to the contrary. As long as the gift is inter
vivos, the fact that the donor was motivated by a desire to avoid
probate is immaterial. This conclusion was reached in a recent
trust case,4 where the court said:
If an owner of property can find means of disposing of it inter
vivos that wvill make a will unnecessary for the accomplishment of his practical purposes, he has a right to employ it.
The fact that the motive of a transfer is to obtain the practical
advantage of a will without making one is immaterial.
3
Deeds in one form or another have often been discussed along this line,
but apparently uncertainty about the validity of an instrument with a reserved
power of revocation eliminated such deeds from consideration. See Keegan,
Deeds4 in Lieu of Wills, 16 A.B.A. Jul. 779 (1930).
National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113
(1944). See also Nichol, Tr., v. Emery, 109 Cal. 323, 41 Pac. 1089 (1895)
where the court said: "A man may desire to make disposition of his property in
his lifetime to avoid administration of his estate after death. Indeed, in Jew of
the fact, both patent and painful, that the fiercest and most expensive litigation,
engendering the bitterest feelings, springs up over wills, such a desire is not
unnatural .. "
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The problem thus resolves into the question of whether a
revocable deed of a legal interest is an inter vivos transfer. There
are not many cases passing upon this precise issue and the
matter may be considered as still open. However, it is submitted,
that logic and the better authority sustain the proposition that
such instruments are not necessarily testamentary. Cases in
Georgia and Kansas6 clearly hold such instruments not to be
testamentary; but since the validity of the reserved power is
doubtful in these states,7 these decisions are of little significance
here. There are also decisions in Alabama," California,9 Connecticut, 10 Indiana," Kentucky," Massachusetts, 3 Mississippi,' 4
5 Smith v. Smith, 167 Ga. 368, 145 S.E. 661 (1928); Price v. Gross, 148
Ga. 137, 96 S.E. 4 (1918); Shelton v. Edenfield, 148 Ga. 128, 96 S.E. 3 (1918);
Hamilton v. Cargile, 127 Ga. 762, 56 S.E. 1022 (1907); Daniel v. Veal, 32 Ga. 589
(1816). But see Dye v. Dye, 108 Ga. 741, 83 S.E. 848 (1899).
6 Thor v. Thorn, 171 Kan. 651, 232 Pac. 250 (1951. Brady v. Fuller, 78
Kan. 448, 96 Pac. 854 (1908); Durand v. Higgins, 67 Kan. 110, 72 Pac. 567
(1903).
7 See chapter H.
8
Mays v. Burleson, 180 Ala. 396, 61 So. 75 (1913). Grantee of deed that
reserved the right to sell brought ejectment against purchasers form the grantor's
heirs. Held: For plaintiff.
9 Lowe v. Ruhlman, 67 Cal. App. 2d 828, 155 P.2d 671 (1945); Tennant v.
John Tennant Memorial Home, 167 Cal. 570, 140 Pac. 242 (1914). In the
Tennant case, the grantee of a deed that reserved the right to revoke in grantor
was sued by grantor's heirs to quiet title and for possession. Held: For defendant. In the Lowe case, the grantee of a deed that purported to coney a
life estate but which reserved to grantor the right to revoke was sued by
grantors general devisees. Held: For defendant.
1' Dennen v. Searly, 149 Conn. 126, 176 A.2d 561 (1961). Four tenants in
common of certain land executed an "agreement" which the court construed
to be a deed, providing that the land should be so held that upon the death of
each coowner the property would vest in the survivor or survivors for life and
upon the death of the last the property would pass to certain named persons.
The instrument also provided that upon the consent of all the origal coowners
that might at any time be living, the property could be sold and the proceeds
retained by such surviving coowners. Upon the death of one of the original
coowners his heirs claimed an undivided quarter of the land. In denying this
claim the court said: "The interests of all of the remaindermen, whatever they
were, were irrevocably granted upon the execution of the deed although subject
to extinction if the power of sale was exercised. The deed did not remain
ambulatory until the death of the grantors, as would have been the case wvith a
will. It was not testamentary in character."
"1Kokomo Trust Co. v. Hiller, 67 Ind. App. 611, 116 N.E. 332 (1917).
Grantee of deed that reserved to grantor the right to sell and convey was sued
by grantor's residuary devisees. Held: For grantee.
12McCampbell v. McCampbell, 198 Ky. 816, 250 S.W. 122 (1923).
Grantees of deed that reserved to grantor the power to revoke sued his subsequently married widow who claimed dower. Held: For Plaintiffs.
'3 Ricker v. Brown, 183 Mass. 424, 67 N.E. 353 (1903). Grantee of deed
conveying all presently owned property "which may be remaining in my name
and ownership at time of my death' was sued by the heirs of the grantor. Held:
For defendant.
'4 Wall v. Wall, 80 Miss. 91, 64 Am. Dec. 147 (1855). Grantees of deed
that reserved to the mak~er the right to revoke it sue to set aside the admission
of the instrument to probate. Held For gantees.
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Missouri, 1'5 and Tennessee' holding that the grantees of such
instruments at the grantor's death have a title that is superior to
the claims of the grantor's heirs. Though the validity of the
reserved power is clearly established only in Alabama, Connecticut, and Kentucky,' 7 the language of the other cases cited indicates that the courts held the instruments to be valid inter vivos
conveyances despite the fact that they felt that an exercise of
the power would have been effective to divest the donee's
interest. However, there are other cases,"" some within the above
mentioned jurisdictions, 9 that indicate that such instruments are
testamentary, and a writer has recently generalized as follows:
If the grantor reserved a power of revocation of the deed or
a power of sale over the property the
20 prevailing view appears
to be that the deed is testamentary.
It seems that much of the confusion caused by these instruments springs from the fact that our concepts of intervivos and
testamentary transfers are undergoing change. At one time, some
courts seemed to feel that any disposition that provided for the
posthumous destination of property was testamentary; 2 ' thus instruments that sought to convey the remainder following a reserved life estate were occasionally held invalid unless executed
with the formalities of a will.22 And the requirements necessary
15 St. Louis County Nat. Bank v. Fielder, 364 Mo. 207, 206 S.W.2d 483
(1953) overruling Goins v. Melton, 343 Mo. 413, 121 S.W.2d 821 (1938).
Grantee of deed with reserved power "to sell, rent, lease, mortgage or otherwise
dispose of said property" was sued by residuary devisee of grantor. Held: For
defendant. Court said: "We think we should put our decision on the ground
that the reservation of a power to revoke is valid because that is the modem
trend."
'1Starper v. Venable, 117 Tenn. 557, 97 S.W. 812 (1906). Grantee of
deed that required him to "deed back to the party of the first part when called
for so to do' was sued by the grantor's heirs. Held: For defendant.
17 See chapter II.
38 North v. North, 2 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Butler v. Sherwood,
196 App. Div. 603, 188 N.Y.S. 242, a....rmed without opinion in 233 N.Y. 655,
135 N.E. 957 (1921); Wren v. Coffey, 26 S.W. 142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894);
Roberts v. Coleman, 37 Wv.Va. 143, 16 S.E. 482 (1892).
I"'Douglas v. Snow, 304 Ky. 805, 202 S.W.2d 629 (1947); Seay v. Huggis,
194 Ala. 496. 70 So. 113 (1915); Ellis v. Pearson, 104 Tenn. 591, 58 S.W. 318
(1900); Cunningham - . Davis, 62 Miss. 366 (1884); Masser v. Masser's
Executor,
.32 Ala. 551 (1858).
2
0 Ritehjde, Alford, and Effland, Cases and Materials on Decedents' Estates
and Trusts 309 (2d ed., 1961). See also, Ward, Deed With Unexercised
Power of Revocation As a Will, 30 Geo. L. Jul. 473 (1942).
21 See Roberts v. Coleman, 37 W. Va. 143, 16 S.E. 482 (1892).
22
Shepherd v. Nabors, 6 Ala. 631 (1844); Dunn v. Bank of Mobile, 2 Ala.
152 (1841)i. This issue did not arise as frequently as might be expected because
(Continued on next page)
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to qualify a revocable trust as a valid, inter vivos conveyance have
23
been materially liberalized only within the last several years.
Though the limits of the inter vivos and testamentary categories
have not yet been established, the courts usually agree that the
primary criterion of doubtful instruments is the intention of the
maker; 24 if he intends that the instrument shall immediately pass
an interest in the property, it is an inter vivos conveyance; 25 but
if he intends that the instrument shall have no immediate effect
and shall26 pass an interest only at his death, then it is testamentary.
The simplicity of this criterion is illusory, for it depends in
large measure upon the subjective element of the party's intent.
From the nature of things, such intent can seldom be known
with certainty; it can only be presumed from the language and
conduct of the party. Since these factors are seldom the same
in any two cases, it is extremely difficult to isolate any particular
factor that of itself will swing the scale one way or the other.
However, the gravest difficulty with the criterion is that the
intent requisite for an inter vivos transfer is not specified with
clarity. The formula merely states an intent "to presently pass
an interest" without attempting to define the term interest. The
ambiguity is evident when we consider the problem raised by
a deed with a power of revocation. Qualified estates have long
been known to the common law and it has never been doubted
that they are "interests" in property.27 As indicated in the last
chapter, courts often construe revocable deeds as conveying a
qualified estate. Thus, it would seem, that an intent to convey
such an estate is all that is necessary to render the disposition
inter vivos. But this argument seems inconclusive for two reasons.
In the first place, a layman is incapable of grasping the signifi(Footnotes continued from preceding page)

of the old common law rule that prevented the creation of freeholds to commence
in futuro.
23
The changing attitude with respect to revocable trusts over which the
settlor has retained elements of management control may be seen in the various
amendments that were made to sec. 57 of Restatement, Trusts, before the second
edition was published.
24 1 Page, The Law of Wills, see. 6.2 (Bowe-Parker Rev. 1960). See also
11 A.L.R. 23 at 41 (1931) and 31 A.L.R.2d 532 at 542 (1953).
Annotations,
25
Page, op. cit. supra note 24, at sec. 6.2; Tiffany, The Law of Real Property,
sec. 1070 (3rd ed., 1939).
26 Page, op. cit. supra note 24, at sec. 6.2.
27 1 Restatement. Property, sees. 16, 9 (1936).
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cance of the myriad divisions of interests in land which are
recognized by the common law; to assume that he could form an
intention concerning such a complex interest as a qualified estate
that is subject to the whim of the grantor would be presumptuous,
if not folly. In the second place, even if he could formulate such
an intent, how can we be certain that such an estate should be
considered an "interest" within the meaning of the rule. Perhaps
a qualified estate that is subject to the whim of the donor is
different in kind and not merely in degree; maybe it should be
relegated to the position of the expectancy of an heir rather than
classified as an "interest."
It is submitted that the intent that the law requires to make
a transfer inter vivos is the same intent that is necessary for
the valid delivery of any instrument. Though even today there
does not seem to be complete unanimity of judicial opinion
thereon, the modem trend is to recognize delivery as the manifestation of an intention to enter into a legal transaction, a manifestation that the act shall produce legal effects. 28 How often
have we immediately signed a contract when shoved into our
hand, and then read it before handing it back? The mere signing
of the paper does not indicate our intention to be bound thereby;
if, upon reading, we find it objectionable, we can destroy it. But
when we hand the instrument back or in any other way relinquish
control over it, we signify our intention that the document is to
be legally operative, that we are to be bound thereby. This is
the purpose and essence of delivery; it enables the court to
separate the legally significant from the irrelevant; it permits the
actor one last minute of grace to contemplate the effect of his act
and the wisdom of undertaking the legal obligations involved
therein.
It seems that many courts have difficulty in harmonizing the
concept of delivery with the reserved power of revocation. If
the grantor has reserved the power to revoke, how can the
instrument be said to have been delivered? The reservation of
the right to revoke, they say, betrays a non-final intent, an intention not to be bound by the instrument. It is submitted, however,
that the mere reservation of such a power does not evidence such
2S 3 American Law of Property, sec. 12.64 (1952); 4 Tiffany, op. cit. Supra
note 24, at see. 1034.
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an intent. The reservation only indicates that the estate conveyed
by the instrument is qualified and not absolute; it has no direct
connection with the donor's intent concerning the binding effect
of the instrument; it is a condition on title and not one on delivery.
Upon execution of the deed, the donor does intend that it shall
be legally binding upon him. True, he realizes that he has not
incurred a heavy liability, for the economic effect of the conveyance can be mitigated by an exercise of the reserved power.
But he does realize that he has entered into a legal act, one whose
effects are regulated and controlled by legal rules and principles
and not wholly by his personal whim or caprice; he realizes that
the transaction cannot be undone simply by destroying the document and pretending that it never existed.
The distinction between conditions on title and conditions on
delivery is illustrated by those cases in which a grantor has
handed an ordinary deed to a third person for the purpose of
being subsequently given to the grantee. In such cases it is
usually held that the transaction is effective only if the grantor
surrenders control over the deed. If he retains an absolute right
to recover the deed from the third person, the third person is
usually considered to be the grantor's agent for the purpose of
making a future delivery; and the transaction is generally held
ineffective.29 If the third person is truly the agent of the grantor,
his alter ego, then the transaction is analagous to the shifting
of the deed from one hand to the other; it contains nothing that
has legal significance as indicating an intention to be bound by
the instrument. Thus, the grantor's right to control the third
person and reclaim the instrument from him in these cases
betrays a non-final intent on his part; it is a condition on delivery
and thus renders the transaction legally ineffective. But if the
grantor retains no right to control the third party, if he cannot
reclaim the deed, his intention that the instrument shall have
legal effect is clear and in this situation the cases generally
sustain the validity of the transaction. 30 This is so even though
29 3 American Law of Property, sec. 12.67 (1952); Tiffany, op. cit. supra
note 24, at secs. 1050, 1054. But see In re Rynier's Estate, 847 Pa. 471, 32 A.2d
736 (1943);
In re Hartman's Estate, 320 Pa. 831, 182 Ati. 232 (1936).
30
Annotation, 52 A.L.R. 1222 (1928). Where an escrow arrangement is used
to implement an agreement to sell, it has been held that the vendor may withdraw from the arrangement and countermand his instructions to the escrowee in
(Continued on next page)
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the grantee is not entitled to the instrument until the occurrence
of some future event, as the payment of the purchase price or
the death of the grantor. Though such conditions are sometimes
referred to as conditions on delivery, they are really conditions
on title,31 and as such they do not detract from the legal efficacy
of the transaction.
Is it possible for a power of revocation to be a condition on
title and not, at the same time, a condition on delivery? This
question was considered in Kokomo Trust Co. v. Hiller.32 In this
case the deed provided: "The grantor reserves full possession
and control of the above described real estate and the right to
sell and convey said real estate during his lifetime, but at his
death if he die seized of the above real estate, then this conveyance shall be in full force and effect. " The deed was given
to one Richards to deliver to the donee at the donor's death;
there was no contingent instruction to return it to the donor if he
should call for it. After the donor died his residuary devisee
brought suit for the land. The court held in favor of the donee.
The court said:
We do not believe, as urged, that the reservation in each of
the deeds of a right to sell and convey the premises should be
taken as part of the instructions given to Richards. The
reservation deals with the quantity of estate conveyed. The
instructions dealt with the disposition of instruments conveying such quantity of estate.... He reserved the right only in
a specified manner to defeat the fee which he had conveyed.
We believe that the reservation and the instructions are distinct propositions.
Thus, the court clearly recognized that the power to revoke can
qualify the title conveyed without affecting the intent which is
required for a valid delivery.
(Footnotes continued from preceding page)

the absence of a valid and binding underlying contract. See Tiffany, op. cit.
supra note 24, at see. 1052.
31 The only reason that the term, conditional delivery, works in these cases is
that a special set of rules has been developed for escrows. Thus even though
there is a "conditional delivery" in these cases, it is held that the grantor may not
withdraw, that the grantee receives some interest in the property before the
occurrence of the event that is subject to execution and alienation, and that
the grantee receives full title upon occurrence of the event with no further
delivery by the grantor or depositary being necessary. Corbin takes the position
that the delivery in these cases is not really conditional; see I Corbin, The Law
of Contracts, sec. 251 (1950).
3z 67 Ind. App. 611, 116 N.E. 832 (1917).
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A similar result was recently reached in a California case,
Osborn v. Osborn 8 In compromise of a disputed claim a father
deeded land to his son; the deed reserved a life estate to the
father and was expressly "subject to all conditions, exceptions
and reservations" contained in a contemporaneously executed
trust agreement. The deed was not given to the son, but was
delivered to the trustees, who were to hold it until the father's
death when it was to be given to the son. There was ill-will
between the parties and apparently the primary purpose of the
trust was the holding of the deed to secure to each the benefits
of the compromise agreement; to allow the father the free use
of the land during life but to require him to pay taxes, repairs,
etc. The agreement provided that either party shall have "the
right to revoke the deed in the event [the other] wilfully harms"
him. After the father's death, his second wife claimed the land
and the son sued to determine his rights. In a divided decision,
the court held in favor of the son. The majority said, in part:
Defendant contends, however, that Thomas' [the father]
reservation of the right to revoke the deed, in the event that
Merinoeth [the son] harmed him .. . made the delivery to
the trustees conditional so that no estate vested in Merinoeth
by virtue of the deposit of the deed with the trustees. This
contention cannot be sustained. Thomas' right to revoke did
not affect the delivery to the trustees, but merely limited the
future interest created to a vested remainder subject to being
divested upon the happening of a condition subsequent.
The distinction between a reservation that qualifies title and
one that qualifies delivery is often confused by broad statements
to the effect that a valid delivery requires that the grantor "surrender his own control over the title,"8 4 or manifest "the intention
to pass immediate and irrevocable title."85 These statements are
true but confusing for they seem to say that a valid delivery
precludes the reservation of any power of revocation; that such
was not the meaning of either of these authorities is clear from
the complete context in which they were made. Where the power
of revocation merely qualifies title, the estate conveyed is irrevocable; the grantor cannot take it back; he can only determine
3342 Cal. App. 2d
343 American Law
5

358, 267 P.2d 333 (1954).

of Property, see. 12.64 (1952).
3 Rothney v. Rothney, 41 Cal. App. 2d 566, 107 P.2d 294 (1940).

1965]

REvocABLE

GIFrs

OF LEGAL INIERET

it by an exercise of the reserved power. This has the practical
effect of revoking the grantee's estate, but such is the nature of
all qualified estates. Upon the occurrence of the defeating or
determining event, the grantee's estate ends.
At first blush this distinction seems rather tenuous and fine;
but it is submitted, it is sound. The law must distinguish between

acts that are preliminary to and in preparation of the dispositive
act and the act itself. If the reservation of the power to revoke
qualifies the intention to enter into a legal act, the intention is
not sufficiently final for the law to recognize it, and the instrument
can have no legal effect. But if the power to revoke qualifies
only the estate conveyed, then the intent to enter into the legal
transaction is clear,"' and effect should be given to it. Whether
the reservation qualifies delivery or title depends upon the
donor's intent concerning the binding effect of the instrument.
If he intends to be able to defeat the donee's claim simply by
destroying the instrument, the reservation is a condition on
delivery, for in such a case the donor does not unequivocally
intend the instrument to be binding on him. But if the donor
intends to be able to defeat the donee's rights only by performing
another legally significant act, then he is unequivocally committed to the legal significance of the instrument (he foregoes the
right to privately determine its operation and effect and submits
these to legal rules and procedures), and the reservation is a
condition on title.37 This seems to be the test advocated by
Ballantine when he wrote:
A deed is not rendered testamentary because of reservations
respecting the use of the property during the grantor's life,

or by provisions that "title" shall pass at the grantors death,
or even by a power of revocation; but it must divest the
2 1It has often been argued that the presence of a power of revocation
indicates the donor intended the instrument as a presence conveyance, else it
was unnecessary to reserve it. See Mays v. Burleson, 180 Ala. 396, 61 So. 75
(1913); Cribbs v. Walker, 74 Ark. 104, 85 S.W. 244 (1905); Hall v. Burkham,
59 Ala. 349 (1877). Cribbs v. Walker, 74 Ark. 104, 85 S.W. 244 (1905). "In
regard to the power of revocation, the better opinion is that it tends rather to
rebut than to sustain the idea that the instrument containing it is of a testamentary
character."
1 Jarman, Wills 17.
37 Thus in Huber v. Backus, 79 S.D. 342, 112 N.W.2d 238 (1961), where
the grantor extracted a parol promise from the grantee that she would reconvey
upon demand, the court stressed that the promise did not reserve to the grantor
any right to recall the instruments themselves. "It did not relate to the deeds
...but concerned only decedent's rights in the property thereby conveyed during
the remainder of his life."
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grantor to some extent of his title, at least to the extent of
creating a liability to
have it drawn out of him without fur38

ther act on his part.

This, it is submitted, is the crux of the distinction between revoc-

able deeds and wills; they might accomplish similar results, but
there is a radical difference in the operation of the two. The will

has legal effect only at the death of the testator; 37 itdoes not
purport to create any rights in the devisee before that time; his
expectancy can be destroyed merely by a destruction of the
instrument. The revocable deed, on the other hand, has legal
effect upon execution; it immediately passes an estate to the
grantee; the estate conveyed cannot be taken back but it can be
determined by a valid exercise of the power; an exercise of the
power requires another legal act with formalities equal to those

that were required for the conveyance to the donee in the first
place. o
It must be conceded that the distinction between a condition
on delivery and a condition on title might elude the average
layman; even some lawyers seems to feel that the grantor of a
deed can revest title in himself merely by destroying the deed.4
However, when making a revocable gift, it is submitted, that the
layman can and does formulate an intention concerning the
binding effect of the instrument upon him. It is this intent that
the court should seek to ascertain in these cases. The closeness
of the distinction will often result in inept language being used
38

Ballantine, When Are Deeds Testamentary? 18 Mich. L. Rev. 470 at 483
(1920).
39 1 Page, The Law of Wills, sec. 5.1 (Bowe-Parker Rev. 1960).
403 Restatement, Property, sec. 846 (1940); see also Simes and Smith, The
Law of Future Interests, sec. 972 (2d ed., 1956). This matter is expressly
regulated by statute in many states which have adopted provisions similar to
the following: "A power can be executed only by a written instrument, which
would be sufficient to pass the estate, or interest, intended to pass under the
power, if the person executing the power were the actual owner." New York Real
Property Law (McKinney 1945) sec. 165; cf. New York Laws 1964, c. 864,
sec. 149.
41 The parties in Rothney v. Rotbney, 41 Cal. App. 2d 566, 107 P.2d 294
(1940), acted under advice of counsel. Though it is arguable that the court
permitted the extinguishment of the reserved power by parol in Hamilton v. Jones,
32 Tex. 598, 75 S.W. 554 (1903), it seems clear that the court really held either
that the power was void or that it has been impliedly stricken from the instrument
before delivery.
Of course, the doctrine of estoppel or the recording statutes often permit
the grantor of an unrecorded deed to create a valid title in a bona fide purchaser. These are special cases, however, and in no way detract from the general
rule.
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in the instrument. The basis of the dissent in the Osborne case,
s'upra, was that the trust agreement also provided that "wilfull
refusal or failure of either party to comply with the obligations
herein provided . . . shall permit either party to rescind this
agreement and shall confer upon the grantor the right to cancel
the within mentioned deed and this agreement by a declaration
duly executed and recorded with the formality of a deed and a
thirty day written notice thereof served upon the grantee...."
Certainly this language can be construed to evidence a condition
on delivery; if the effects of the instruments can be frustrated
simply by their cancellation or destruction, they have not been
validly delivered. But the majority, looking at the whole transaction-the prior compromise agreement and the complex method
utilized to effectuate it-concluded that the parties had intended
the instruments to have present, legal effect and that this language
must be construed otherwise. It is submitted that this is a sound
result, for the intention required for delivery must be gleaned
not only from the language of the instrument but also from the
circumstances surrounding its execution.42 Some courts have been
very liberal 43 in this matter and have held that instruments that
purported to reserve the power to revoke "this deed" 44 or which
provided that the deed was to be "null and void " r,upon exercise
of the power, to be valid. Literally construed, such language
betrays an intent that would be fatal to a valid delivery. However, if the court can satisfy itself that the donor had the requisite
intent, it would appear to be proper to construe the words as a
limitation on the title and thus give effect thereto.
The cases that have held deeds with powers of revocation
testamentary have usually involved instruments that reserved
more than a power to revoke and whose language betrayed an
intention that the instrument create no present right in the
See Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, secs. 1034-46 (3rd ed., 1939).
43 By far the most liberal is Ricker v. Brown, 183 Mass. 424, 67 N.E. 353
(1903), w.here the deed purported to convey all property presently owned and
"which may be remaining in my name and ownership at time of my death.' It
is difficult to harmonize this language with the intent that is required for a valid
delivery. But this was a "hard case" and probably will not be extended.
44
Wall v. Wall, 30 Miss. 91, 64 Am. Dec. 147 (1855).
4
5 Mays v. Burleson, 180 Ala. 396, 61 So. 75 (1913). In Kokomo Trust Co.
v. Hiller, supra at note 32, the deed was to be "in ill force and effect" if land
was not sold during the grantor's lifetime.
4'
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grantee. 46 Butler v. Sherwood47 is an oft-cited case of this nature.
A woman about to undergo a serious operation, executed an
instrument that purported to be a quit-claim deed of all her
realty and personalty to her husband. The instrument provided:
"This conveyance and transfer are made upon the condition that
the party of the second part, my husband, survive me, and the
same is intended to vest and take effect upon my decease and
until said time the same shall be subject to revocation upon the
part of the party of the first part" The court held the instrument
to be testamentary and ineffective to convey any title to the
husband. The court said:
It could not be determined at any time prior to her death
whether her husband survived her, and unless he survived
her there was clearly no intention of conveying to him.
Moreover, she provided that the conveyance and transfer
"are intended to vest and take effect only upon my decease".
. . . There was no moment from the time of making the
instrument down to the very instant of dissolution when any
rights could vest under the intent or language of this deed,
and beyond this it was provided that "until said time, the
same shall be subject to revocation upon the part of the party
of the first part"; so that the supposed grantor was in full
control of the property during all of her life subsequent to
the making of the deed, with the right reserved to revoke the
instrument itself. (emphasis supplied.)
It is difficult to generalize this decision. The mere condition that
the grantee survive the grantor has been held sufficient to render
an instrument testamentary. 48 The same is true of provisions that
46 Thus in Roberts v. Coleman, 37 W. Va. 143, 16 S.E. 482 (1892) and
Mosser v. Mosser's Executor, 32 Ala. 551 (1858), the instruments referred to
executors and administrators. In Ellis v. Pearson, 104 Tenn. 591, 58 S.W. 318
(1900) and Wren v. Coffey, 26 S.W. 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894), the instruments
purported to convey at death if not disposed of before then. And in Seay v.
Huggins, 194 Ala. 496 70 So. 113 (1918); Dye v. Dye, 108 Ga. 741, 33 S.E. 848
(1899). and Cunningham v. Davis, 62 Miss. 366 (1844), the instruments provided that they were not to be effective until death. Concerning the influence
of such language as this, see Cohn v. Klein, 209 Cal. 421, 287 Pac. 459 (1930),
where the court expressly recognized that an instrument that contained a power
of revocation might have been effective to create a defeasible interest had such
language not betrayed an improper intent.
47 196 App. Div. 603, 188 N.Y.S. 242, affirmed without opinion in 233
N.Y. 655, 135 N.E. 957 (1921).
9 ov. Hutchinson, 164 Ga. 661, 139 S.E. 519 (1927); Spicer v. Spicer,
314 Ky. 569, 236 S.W.2d 474 (1951); 1 Page, The Law of Wills, sec. 6.6 (BoweParker Rev. 1960).
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the conveyance shall take effect at death 49 However, the court
expressly construed the reservation as being the right "to revoke
the instrument itself." As explained above, if such was the maker's
intent, this was a condition on delivery and not one on title. It
is admittedly difficult to determine the maker's intent in this
matter but in view of all the language in the deed, no objection
to this finding of the court can be made. So construed the case
is perfectly consistent with the proposition that a reservation of
a power to revoke which merely qualifies the title conveyed
does not render the instrument testamentary.
In this case the court seemed disturbed by the fact that the
deceased "undertook to accomplish by deed what the law requires
to be done by will." Since stress has been placed on the similarity
in effect between a revocable deed and a will, it might be well to
specify the difference between the two. If the deceasd in this
case intended to retain all elements of ownership so that she could
destroy the husband's claims simply by destroying the instrument,
her intent was clearly testamentary. But if she intended the
instrument to create rights that could not be destroyed so simply,
if she intended the instrument to have permanent existence, her
intent was not testamentary.10 Once a will is revoked, it has no
significance in an abstract of title; but a deed which has been
revoked pursuant to a power must always remain in the history
of title; it is like a mortgage that has been satisfied; its present
effect might be nil, but it did operate to place, at least, a part of
the title for a time in another.
The problems faced by courts in determining the intent in
these cases is only a little more difficult than that involved in
cases dealing with deeds that contain no power of revocation
but which expressly state that they are not to take effect until
the maker's death or that the title is to vest only at the maker's
death. At first courts took a formal approach to such instruments,
49Purcell v. Baskett, 121 Kan. 678, 249 Pac. 671 (1936); Nobell v. Beaver,
1:33 Okla. 247, 271 Pac. 420 (1928); 4 Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, sec.
1074 (3rd ed., 1939).
Gu "The right to revoke a will, which is based on the fact that the will does
not become operative until the testator's death, is in effect a right to render the
instrument absolutely nugatory, -hile an express power of revocation contained
in a conveyance inter vivos does not involve a right to render the instrument
absolutely nugatory, but merely impowers the grantor to divest an estate or
interest which is created by the conveyance." 4 Tiffany, The Law of Real
Property, see. 1071 (3rd ed., 1939).
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gave the language a literal and technical interpretation, and held
the instruments testamentary.5 1 But experience has demonstrated
that laymen do not always perceive the distinction between a
present conveyance of a future interest and a future conveyance
of a possessory interest. A desire to effectuate the intention of
the parties has caused some courts to reevaluate their prior
holdings and sustain such instruments if satisfied that the makers
intended them to have present effect. 2
It is probable that the makers of some deeds providing that
they were not to be effective until death were desirous of making
revocable gifts. No objection can be taken to decisions holding
these instruments ineffective. The intent required to make a valid
revocable deed is complex; it requires the intention that the
instrument shall always be effective as a conveyance, though the
economic effect of the transaction can be defeated in a very
limited and specified manner-the exercise of the reserved power
that determines the grantee's estate. The further the language
strays from the customary form, the less likely it is that the donor
had the requisite intent, and the more reluctant the court should
be in giving effect to the instrument. This conclusion results from
the wisdom of the requirement of delivery in Anglo-American
law. It would be wrong for a court to give effect to an act that
was not definitely intended to have legal significance. As indicated above the mere signing of the instrument is not a sufficient
safeguard in this respect; but when the maker evidences his
intention that the instrument is final, that it creates present legal
rights that are binding on him, then the instrument can and
should be given effect according to its terms.
Although it is submitted that the foregoing discussion of
51
5 2 1 Page, The Law of Wills, see. 6.5 (Bowe-Parker Rev. 1960).

Lindsey v. Christian, 222 Ark. 169, 257 S.W.2d 935 (1953); Smith v.

Smith, 218 Ark. 228, 235 A.W.2d 886 (1951); Carter Oil Co. v. McQuigg, 27 F.
Supp. 182 (D.C. MI.1939), affirmed 112 F.2d 275; Couch v. Hoover, 18 Tenn.
App. 523, 79 S.W.2d 807 (1934). 1 Page, The Law of Wills, sec. 6.5 (BoweParker Rev. 1960); 4 Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, see. 1074 (3rd ed.,
1939); Comment, 16 Univ. Det. L. Jnl. 87 (1953); Note, 10 Miss. L. Jnl. 183
(1938). But see Gaston v. Mitchell, 192 Miss. 452, 4 So. 2d 892, 6 So. 2d 818
(1941), where the court said: "We are no longer free to rationalize as to the
effect of such a provision. It has repeatedly teen held by the Court to be
testamentary and inoperative to vest any interest in praesenti. Its plain language
is not susceptible of a construction that only the delivery and enjoyment of the
property is to be withheld, but in specific terms provides that the conveyance
itself is to be effective as such, not from the date of execution, but at grantor's
death."
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revocable deeds is analytically sound and correct, this study
would be incomplete without a consideration of the policy questions raised by their testamentary flavor. We must recognize that
a revocable deed permits a man to make a testamentary-type
disposition of his property without complying with the strict
formalities required for the due execution of wills, and it must be
questioned whether or not anything of importance is lost by the
absence of these formalities. It is generally said that the formalities of the Statute of Wills serve two principal functions: one,
evidentiary; the other, ritual. 3 By the former the court is assured
that the instrument is genuine and truly the act of the decedent.
And by the latter the court is assured that the instrument was
executed with deliberation and intended as a will, that it was not
merely a preliminary draft or haphazard scribbling.
It seems clear that the formalities of execution, that are
essential to the validity of all deeds of realty, serve the same ends
as the ritual function of the Statute of Wills. Though the formalities of a deed are less than those of a will, they are certainly
sufficient to caution an intending grantor and warn him of the
seriousness of his act. And when the requirement of delivery is
added to these formalities, it would appear that the ritual function
is better served by deeds, even though they reserve a power of
revocation, than by wills; for though an intent that a will is to
be legally effective is presumed from the formalities of its execution, the law in the requirement of delivery demands other
evidence of its intent before giving effect to a deed; as indicated
above delivery requires the manifestation of an intent that the
instrument is legally operative and creates indestructible, though
possibly defeasible, rights in another.
It is submitted that the evidentiary function of the Statute of
Wills is also better served by revocable deeds than by wills. The
will is essentially a secret document; though the witnesses attest
to its execution, they usually do not know its contents and, when
testifying at probate, usually cannot be certain that pages were
MGuilliver and Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 Yale L. Jnl.
1 (1941). The authors mention a third, the protective function, which seeks to
protect the testator from imposition while on his death bed. They suggest that
this function is outmoded today when most wills are executed in lawyers' offices
while testators are in good health. These same considerations are equally
applicable to revocable deeds.
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not substituted at some time after it was executed. The deed on
the other hand is more public in nature. It will usually pass
beyond the physical control of the grantor at delivery; it will
generally be recorded. It will often pass an estate that takes
effect in possession during the life of the grantor. 4 Thus the
deed is "in circulation" and creates rights in others during the
grantors life. If it were not genuine in any respect, the purported
grantor would naturally object, and the forgery would be immediately discovered. The superiority of such an instrument over
a will in this respect is obvious; there can be no better guarantee
of the genuiness of an act than the acquiescence in it by the
purported actor.
Thus, it is submitted that nothing of real importance is lost
by the absence of the strict formalities of the Statute of Wills in
the execution of revocable deeds. Moreover, it is submitted that
a strong argument for the validity of such instruments can be
drawn from the fact that Anglo-American law considers the right
generally to determine one's successors in interest as an incident
of complete ownership: the execution of a revocable deed is a

reasonable and deliberate attempt to exercise this right, and as
such our courts should strive to effectuate it.15 Ballantine concluded his study on the distinction between deeds and wills with
an observation that is appropriate in this regard. He said:
It is a more convenient and economical method to dispose of
property by deed than by will. It would be the sounder policy
for the law, in case of doubt, not to be overready to condemn
an instrument as testamentary, but to uphold it as a deed of
conveyance, and thus make it effectual in the simplest manner, especially if it be so executed as not to be good as a willWe
54

1t has been suggested that courts might distinguish between revocable
deeds that convey a possessory interest and those that convey only a future interest.
See Note, 23 Miss. L. Rev. 683 (1939). The courts have not drawn such
distinction and, it is submitted, rightly so. Though it is much easier to see the
objective fact of a change of possession, the law recognizes the transfer of right
or interest as being just efficacious. Though this metaphysical transfer i snot
visible, its occurrence is recognized and felt by the donor who realizes that he
cannot frustrate it without performing another, affirmative legal act.
55 See Gulliver and Tilson, op. cit. supra note 53, at 2.
56 Ballantine, When Are Deeds Testamentary? 18 Mich. L. Rev. 470 at 483
(1920).

Chapter IV: The Rights of Third Parties.
The rights of persons claiming through the grantor or grantee
of a revocable deed depend in some measure upon the theory
that is used to sustain the transaction between the original parties.
Some courts have spoken of the reserved right of revocation as a
condition subsequent' while others have held it to be a true
power. 2 Though under either theory the grantee receives a qualified estate,3 the grantor's rights may vary materially depending
on which approach is taken. Discussion here will be limited to a
consideration of the rights that flow to the various parties when
the reservation is viewed as creating a power. This is the approach most recent cases have taken with respect to the operation
of revocable deeds,4 and it is submitted, the one that will be
taken in any future case in which the choice is material to the
outcome.5
Once this theory is accepted, it is not difficult to define the
interest and rights of the donee. Upon execution of the instrument he receives a qualified estate and his rights are the same as
the holder of any other similar estate. Depending upon the
terms of the grant it may be an estate for years, for life, or in
fee; it may be possessory or future; however, the mere fact that
it is subject to a power does not make it contingent.6 The grantee
may convey his interest at pleasure; 7 it is subject to the claims of
his creditors;" and if inheritable it is subject to the claims of his
surviving spouseY Upon the expiration of the power unexercised
the estate automatically becomes absolute, 10 and the donee's interest is then treated in the same way that it would have been if
no power had been reserved.
1 Ricketts v. Louislle, St. L. & T. By. Co., 91 Ky. 221, 15 S.W. 182 (1891);
Blanchard v. Morey, 56 V. 170 (1883).
2 Stamper v. Venable, 117 Tenn. 557, 97 S.W. 812 (1906); Bouton v. Doty,
69 Conn. 531, 37 Ad. 1064 (1897).
3 See 1 Restatement, Property, sec. 16 (1936), where the term "fee simple
defeasible" is used instead of "qualified fee."
4St. Louis County Nat. Bank v. Fielder, 364 Mo. 207, 206 S.W.2d 483
(1953). Harman v. Hurst, 160 Md. 96, 153 At. 24 (1931); Tennant v. John
Tennant Memorial Home, 167 Cal. 570, 140 Pac. 242 (1914).
GSee herein, supra at page 18.
6 See Simes and Smith, The Law of Future Interests, sec. 150 (2d ed., 1956).
7 1 Restatement, Property, sec. 50 (1936).
8 1 Restatement, Property, see. 52 (1936).
9 1 Restatement, Property, sec. 54 (1936).
10 1 Restatement, Property, sec. 58 (1936).
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The successors to the grantee's interest, however, take through
him and thus hold subject to the same limitations he did.' Since
it is customary to reserve the power of revocation in the deed of
gift, there will seldom be any possibility of a bona fide purchaser
without notice from the grantee. However, since the power can
be reserved in a separate instrument, the situation might arise and
it seems likely that the power would be cut off in such a case.
Though no cases on this point have been found, this conclusion
seems to flow naturally from the fact that the power is not an
interest in property.'" Moreover, statutes in many states expressly
notice are concerned, a power shall be a charge upon land only
provide that in so far as creditors and purchasers for value without
from the date that the instrument containing the power is
recorded.'
It has at times been argued that the subjection of the successors of the grantee's interest to the grantor's power of revocation
is repugnant in so far as it permits the defrauding of just claimants
through the grantee. It must be conceded that a levy by creditors
upon the donee's interest is likely to prove futile, for the grantor
will probably exercise his reserved power before they can derive
any economic benefit from the land. However, this objection
was succinctly answered by the court in Ricketts v. Louisville, St.
L. & T. Ry. Co.,14 when it observed:
The deed is notice to the creditors of the reserved power. If
they trust the grantee upon the credit of the estate thus
granted, they do so knowing the risk, because the deed gives
them notice of it.

This reply might be little comfort to the unpaid creditors; possibly the law should be more solicitous of them. However, it is
submitted that the law goes as far as it can in these cases. If the
donor permits the donee to retain his qualified estate in the
property, the creditors can compel payment therefrom; but if the
donee's interest is terminated, he has no further rights to the
111 Restatement, Property, see. 50 (1986).

12 See 4 American Law of Property, sec. 17.8 (1952) on the operation of the
recording acts.
13 See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) sec. 26.125; New York Laws 1964,
c. 864, § 142. Compare Del. Code Ann. (1953) titl. 25, see. 109.
14 91 Ky. 221, 15 S.W. 182 (1891).
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property, and his creditors can have none. The law cannot
compel a benefactor to pay the debts of the recipient of his
bounty merely because of his past liberality. The situation is
somewhat analagous to that that arises in cases involving protective trusts.15
These same considerations are equally applicable to the
grantee's surviving spouse. The better rule recognizes the derivative character of dower and curtesy; these rights are merely
incidents of and therefore cannot be greater than the other
spouse's estate.'0 Thus, it seems clear that the claim of the
surviving spouse of a deceased grantee is also subject to the
grantor's reserved power. 7 But since she will usually have notice,
and since she is never a purchaser, there does not appear to be
any reason to consider this result unjust.
Though the operation of revocable deeds causes little difficulty
in so far as the interest of the grantees and the claims of their
successors are concerned, the same is not true when the rights of
the grantor are being considered. The classical notion that a
power is merely a right to affect title to property but not an
interest therein has caused much difficulty in this respect.' 8 It is
well settled that in the absence of statute the creditors of the
donee of a general power of appointment cannot reach the
property subject thereto unless the power is exercised in favor
of a volunteer.' This rule of the law of powers was applied by
the Supreme Court of the United States in lones v. Clifton" to a
power of revocation reserved by the grantor in a deed. In this
case a man deeded land to his wife but reserved a power to
revoke the grant. He subsequently became insolvent and the
assignee in bankruptcy sued to recover the land from the wife.
In holding in favor of the wife the court reiterated the maxim
that a power is not a transferable interest in property and hence
cannot be reached by creditors. In the only other case found
25 See Scott, The Law of Trusts, see. 155 (2d ed., 1956).
10 See Monograph on Dower & Curtesy as Derivative Estates in 1 Restatement, Property, Appendix, 1-15 (1936); 1 Walsh, Commentaries on the Law of
Real Property, see. 100 (1947).
'7 1 Restatement, Property, see. 54 (1936).
18 Simes and Smith, The Law of Future Interests, see. 942 (2d ed., 1956);
5 American Law of Property, see. 28.14 (1952).
1' Simes and Smith, op. cit. supra note 18, at sec. 944.
2, 101 U.S. 225 (1879).
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involving a revocable deed of a legal interest2 ' a state court
reached a similar conclusion.
There is much that can be said against the conclusion of each
of these cases. Whether the power is a transferable interest in
property or not, it is certainly a thing of value to its holder. He
can increase the value of his estate in the amount of the property
subject to the power merely by performing the formalities
required for an exercise of the power. Why should it be beyond
the reach of creditors? Though the only cases found actually
involving deeds of legal interests are the ones mentioned above,
there are two competing lines of trust cases that are somewhat
analagous. The first of these lines tends to support the results of
the cases already discussed and to indicate that the grantor's
creditors cannot reach his reserved power of revocation. These
are the cases holding that the mere fact that a trust is revocable
does not in the absence of statute enable a settlor's creditors to
reach the trust estate.2 The other line of authority contains cases
in which the settlor reserved a general power of appointment
rather than a power of revocation. The American Law Institute
has taken the position that when
a person transfers property in trust for himself, for life and
reserves a general power of appointment, although the power
is not exercised, the interest subject to such power and the
settlor's beneficial life interest, can both be subjected to the
payment of the claims of creditors of such person and claims
against his estate to whatever extent other available property
is insufficient for that purpose.2

Comparatively few cases have applied this rule and its limits
are therefore indefinite. No logical reason is seen why it could
not be extended to apply to cases in which the settlor has reserved
a power of revocation rather than a power of appointment; nor
for that matter does there appear to be any reason why the rule
must be limited to eases in which the settlor has reserved a life
estate along with his power. This rule, which is still in the
21
Continental Nat. Bank of Louisville v. McCampbell, 184 Ky. 658, 213
S.W. 193 (1919).
223 Scott, The Law of Trusts, sec. 330.12 (2d ed., 1956); 2 Restatement,
Trusts,
23 sec. 330, com. 0 (2d ed., 1959).
lBestatement, Property, sec. 328 (1948 supplement). See also Simes and
Smith, op. cit. supra note 18, at sec. 944; 5 American Law of Property, sec. 23.18
(1952).
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state of development, seems to indicate that the courts might be
taking a more sympathetic approach to the claims of creditors
in this type of ease. Since authority involving the rights of the
creditors of the grantor of a revocable deed of a legal interest is
scarce, possibly the courts in future cases involving such claims
will lean towards this line of trust cases and work out some
method of relief.
Even though the present state of the decisions offers little
hope to the grantor's creditors, there are statutes which provide
relief in certain types of cases. The National Bankruptcy Act 4
provides that all powers that the bankrupt might have exercised
for his own benefit can be reached by the trustee in bankruptcy
Though it might still be arguable whether or not this provision is
applicable to a reserved power that is exercisable only by will, it

is clearly applicable to all powers that might have
during the bankrupts life. 5 Thus it would apply
able deed cases 26 and give relief to the grantor's
has committed an act of bankruptcy and can be so

been exercised
to most revoccreditors if he
adjudicated.

There are more liberal statutes in many states that give relief
to creditors even though the grantor is not or cannot be adjudicated bankrupt. Thus a New York statute 7 provides:
Where the grantor is a conveyance reserves to himself for his
own benefit, an unqualified power of revocation, he is thereafter deemed still to be the absolute owner of the estate conveyed, so far as the rights of his creditors and purchasers are
concerned.
There are similar statutes in Alabama, 28 Florida,29 Indiana, 0 Kansas, 31 Michigan, 32 Minnesota, 33 North Dakota,3 4 Oklahoma,s South
Dakota,3" and Wisconsin. The language of these statutes is very
24

Sec. 70(a), 11 U.S.C., sec. 110(a).
See 1 Scott, The Law of Trusts, sees. 57.1, 330.12 (2d ed., 1956).
Though the grantor reserved a power to revoke "by deed or will in a few
cases, none has been found in which he reserved a power to revoke by will alone.
27 New York Laws 1964, c. 864, sec. 163.
28
Ala. Code (1940) tit. 47, sec. 75.
2
9 Fla. Stats. Ann. (1941) sec. 726.08.
20 Ind. Stats. Ann. (Burns 1961) sec. 56-610.
11 Kan. Gen. Stats. (1949) sec. 67-414.
32 Mich. Comp. Laws (1939) sec. 26.104.
33
Minn. Stats. (1953) see. 502.76.
34 N. D. Century Code (1959) sec. 59.0535.
35 60 Okla. Stats. Ann. (West 1963) see. 267.
36S. D. Code (1939) sec. 59.0444.
37
Wise. Stats. Ann. (West 1957) 232.13.
25
26

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL

[Vol. 54,

broad and seems clearly applicable to all creditors and purchasers
from the grantor, whether they take with notice of the prior
deed or not. Thus in Blackwell v. Harbin38 the court applied such
a statute in favor of a subsequent grantee from a donor who had
not exercised his power of revocation, the court said:
One who purchases from the grantor-whether with or without
knowledge or notice of the previous existence of the instrument
in which the reservation was made-and takes his conveyance
is protected in the title conveyed to him, just as if the grantor
had not make the previous instrument to another, containing
the reservation of a power of revocation.39
Of course the fact that a deed contains a power of revocation
does not exempt it from the general rules concerning fraudulent
conveyances. If the gift is made during insolvency, if it renders
the grantor insolvent, or if it is made with the intent of defrauding creditors, it is voidable by them.40 The general creditors are
thus afforded a measure of protection by these provisions. There
are also special provisions in the statutes of many states concerning the fraudulent nature of conveyances which reserve a power
of revocation and which provide that such conveyances of land
are void against "subsequent purchasers from such grantor for a
valuable consideration of any estate or interest so liable to be
revoked."' 4 ' These statutes have seldom been judicially construed,

but it would seem that such subsequent purchasers could be
afforded similar protection even in the absence of statute. It has
often been held that a power of appointment may be exercised
by implication; this is especially true where the instrument clearly
refers to the property over which a power is held and where the
instrument could have no operation except as an exercise of the
power.42 It would seem that this general principle of the law of
powers 43 could be applied to revocable deeds and relief granted
38186 Ala. 531, 65 So. 35 (1914).
39
It would seem that a similar result could often be reached under statutes
that under certain circumstances purport to change "an absolute power of
disposition" into a fee in so far as the rights of creditors are concerned.
40 1 Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences, sees. 262-272 (Rev. ed.
1940). Concerning the extent to which future creditors are protected, see sees.
316-340.
41 These statutes are cited in chapter II at note 117.
42 Simes and Smith, The Law of Future Interests, sec. 973 (2d ed., 1956).
4Teeare statutes in some states which seem~ to be particularizations of
these general principles. See Cal. Civ. Code (Deering 1949) sec. 1229; Idaho
(Continued on next page)
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to purchasers of the property from the grantor even in the absence

of the statutory provision.
If the grantor has exercised his reserved power, the situation
presents little difficulty. Upon exercise of the power the grantee's

estate ceases;44 the grantor becomes vested of his original estate,
and his creditors may reach it in the same manner as though the
deed had never been executed. However, courts have sometimes

had difficulty in determining when and to what extent the power
has been exercised. Assuming compliance with the formal requirements it seems that whether an instrument is an exercise
of the power, and if so, to what extent, is primarily a question of

the manifested intention of the party. In Continental Nat. Bank
of Louisville v. McCampbel46 a man deeded land to his wife for
life, remainder to his children; the deed expressly provided that
the grantor "does hereby retain, reserve and hold the power to
revoke in whole or in part the grant of any and all of said land or
any part or parts thereof."

The man subsequently became

indebted to plaintiff who obtained a judgment against him. The
donor subsequently mortgaged the property to another to secure
payment of a present loan. Arguing the mortgage was a total

revocation of the prior deed, the plaintiff thereupon brought this
action to subject the land to the payment of his judgment. The
court held in favor of the donees, saying:
We are of the opinion that the mortgage ...if a revocation
at all, was but a pro tanto revocation of the deed .... This
(Footnotes continued from preceding page)

Code (1948) sec. 55-903; Mont. Rev. Code (1947) tit. 29, see. 203; N. D.
Century Code (1959) tit. 59, sec. 0559; S.D. Code (1939) tit. 51, sec. 1407.
44 1 Restatement, Property, see. 56 (1936).
45 The formal requirements of an instrument executing a power are established by a combination of the provisions of the instrument creating the power
and by certain rules of law. Thus when the power is created, its author may
speefy6 that it be executed only "by will" or "by deed." He may require additional formalities, e.g., a will with four wituesses, but statutes often specify that
such additional formalities are not essential to the validity of an exercise of the
power. However, it seems that he may not authorize less formalities than would
be necessary to transfer the interest if it were owned by the holder of the power.
3 Powell, The Law of Real Property, sees. 398, 399 (1952); 3 Restatement,
Property, sec. 346 (1940). The statutes of many states expressly so provide. See
Ala. Code (1940) tit. 47, see. 82; D. C. Code (1961) tit. 19, sec. 107-wills; Ky.
Rev. Stats. (1956) sec. 394.070-wills; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) sec. 566.40;
Minn. Stats. (1953) sec. 502.64, 502.65; New York Laws 1964, c. 864, sees. 148,
149; N. D. Century Code (1959) tit. 59, sec. 0521; 60 Okla. Stats. Ann. (West
1963) see. 224; S. D. Code (1939) tit. 39, sec. 0421; Va. Code (1950) sec. 64-52;
Wise. Stats. Ann. (Vest 1957) 232.38.
4- 184 Ky. 658, 213 S.W. 193 (1919).
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construction is not inconsistent with the terms of the power
reserved in the deed, for it must be borne in mind that McCampbell reserved and held the power to revoke in whole or
in part the grant made to his wife and children ....
If the
mortgage amounts to an exercise of the power thus reserved,
it did so only to the extent of the mortgage debt, and did not
embrace the whole estate or any part greater than enough to
satisfy the $8,000 with interest and costs. The residue, whatever ascertained to be, did not belong to McCampbell but
was the property of his children as remaindermen.
This decision seems sound, but it is submitted that the court was
merely being cautious when it stressed the fact that the reservation expressly referred to a partial revocation. It is well settled
that in the absence of controlling language to the contrary a
donee of a general power of appointment may divide the estate
into as many parts and interests as he sees fit; he need not
exercise the whole power at one time nor need he give the whole
estate to one person. 47 The same should be true by analogy of
the power of revocation and should justify a court in recognizing
a grantor's subsequent execution of a mortgage as only a partial
exercise of his reserved power of revocation.
In Cassady v. Cain4 s the Kentucky court was again called on
to determine whether or not a grantor had exercised his reserved
power. Here the owner of mineral lands conveyed them to
plaintiff, reserving "full control and management of all the properties hereby conveyed for and during his natural life, together
with all the rents, or incomes from any and every source that may
be derived from said property, or either of them, and he further
reserves the right during his natural life to sell and convey said
property, or any part thereof, with good title, as though this deed
had never been executed." The grantor subsequently sold and
conveyed away the surface rights. Later the grantor and plaintiff
united in the execution of an oil and gas lease to X by the terms
of which a royalty of three hundred dollars per year was to be
paid on each producing well drilled. About ten years later the
grantor entered into a written contract with defendant, who
owned adjoining lands, whereby it was agreed that if defendant
procured an assignment of X's lease, he would exploit both his
47

Simes and Smith, The Law of Future Interests, sec. 976 (2d ed., 1956).
48311 Ky. 179, 223 S.W.2d 744 (1949).
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own and the grantor's property and pay a royalty of one hundred
dollars on each well on either tract. The defendant was successful
in procuring the assignment but the grantor died soon thereafter.
The plaintiff thereupon brought this suit to determine the rights
of the parties. The court held that the deed to the plaintiff had
not been revoked in so far as the oil and gas rights were concerned; since the donee was the owner in remainder of the
minerals, he was not bound by the agreement and was entitled to
enforce the original terms of the lease. This conclusion seems
sound. The power could not be validly exercised except by an
instrument bearing the formalities of a deed. Moreover, the
grantor had not evidenced an intention to revoke the gift in remainder of the mineral rights; indeed he had the plaintiff join
with him in the execution of the lease to X after he had conveyed
away the surface rights by himself. Possibly the contract with
the defendant was intended to bind only the life estate; however,
in all probability it was preliminary to making some arrangement
whereby plaintiff could enjoy the benefits thereof upon the
grantor's death; but certainly it was not intended as a revocation
of plaintiffs gift.
Much of what has heretofore been said concerning the rights
of a grantor's creditors is equally applicable to the rights of a
surviving spouse who was married by the grantor after executing
a revocable deed.49 Since the reserved power is not considered
to be an interest in property, the surviving spouse can ordinarily
claim no dower interest in the land. This is the conclusion that
was reached by the court in McCampbell v. McCampbell. ° This
result might seem unfair; but it again appears that cases involving
revocable trusts are analogous, and here they suggest possible
limits to the rule. Doctrines of illusory trusts, fraud on the
spouse's share, and colorable transfers are being developed to
prevent husbands and wives from using the revocable trust to
frustrate the dower and other testamentary rights of their
spouses.' No reason is seen why these same doctrines could not
be applied to revocable deeds so that the surviving spouse of the
4
9 It is also applicable to the rights of spouses married subsequent to the
deed in states that have substituted a statutory share for the inchoate right of
dower.

GO198 Ky. 816, 250 S.W. 122 (1928).

1 See Macdonald, Fraud on the Widow's Share (Michigan Legal Studies
1960).
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maker of such an instrument could not be permitted to claim her
rights in the property conveyed in the same way and under the
same circumstances.
Concededly there are reasons of policy which indicate that a
man should not be allowed to place property beyond the claims
of his creditors and surviving spouse while retaining substantial
elements of control thereover. It is submitted that these reasons
do not argue against the validity of revocable deeds; they merely
argue for a changed concept of the nature of reserved powers.
Whether the revocable deed of a legal interest is recognized as
valid or not, the revocable trust appears to be a permanent
institution in American law. Thus a solution to these problems
will eventually have to be found and there seems to be no reason
why the solution developed for the trust cases cannot be made
equally applicable to the non-trust cases. Thus, it is submitted,
these difficulties should not deter courts from recognizing the
validity of such a useful instrument as the revocable deed of
gift.

